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We model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints.
While saving cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge against future income shortfalls,
reducing debt - "saving borrowing capacity" - is a more effective way of securing future investment
in high cash flow states. This trade-off implies that constrained firms will allocate excess cash flows
into cash holdings if their hedging needs are high (i.e., if the correlation between operating cash
flows and investment opportunities is low). However, constrained firms will use excess cash flows
to reduce current debt if their hedging needs are low. The empirical examination of cash and debt
policies of a large sample of constrained and unconstrained firms reveals evidence that is consistent
with our theory. In particular, our evidence shows that financially constrained firms with high
hedging needs have a strong propensity to save cash out of cash flows, while showing no propensity
to reduce outstanding debt. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs systematically
channel free cash flows towards debt reduction, as opposed to cash savings. Our analysis points to
an important hedging motive behind standard financial policies such as cash and debt management.
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Standard valuation models subtract the amount of cash in the ﬁrm’s balance sheet from the value
of outstanding debt to compute the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverage. This practice reﬂects the view of cash
as the “negative” of debt: because cash balances can be readily used to redeem debt (a senior
claim), only net leverage should matter in gauging shareholders’ (residual) wealth. The traditional
valuation approach can also be understood under an “indiﬀerence” argument: since ﬁnancial assets
and liabilities are largely unrelated to the real business activities of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, shareholders
should be indiﬀerent between one extra dollar of cash and one less dollar of debt in the balance
sheet. In one way or another, the standard valuation approach does not assign much of a relevant,
independent role for cash stocks in the presence of debt.
In contrast to this view, a number of recent studies argue that cash holdings are an important
component of the ﬁrm’s optimal ﬁnancial structure. Among other results, these studies show that
cash policies are empirically associated with ﬁrm value, growth opportunities, business risk, and
performance. They also show that cash holdings relate to issues ranging from ﬁrms’ access to the
capital markets to the quality of laws protecting minority investors.1 One interpretation of the
ﬁndings in this literature is that cash should not be seen as negative debt for a large fraction of
ﬁrms: cash stocks seem to play a relevant economic role. However, as Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson (1999) point out, most of the variables that are empirically associated with high
cash levels are also known to be associated with low leverage. The ﬁndings that cash holdings are
systematically related to variables such as growth opportunities and risk – although relevant in
their own right – may therefore not fully identify ﬁrms’ policies toward cash and debt balances. In
eﬀect, those ﬁndings cannot rule out the argument that ﬁrms do regard cash and negative debt as
substitutes. In the words of Opler et al. (p.44), “...it is important to ﬁgure out, both theoretically
and empirically, to what extent cash holdings and debt are two sides of the same coin.”
This paper proposes a testable theory of cash—debt substitutability in the optimal ﬁnancial policy
of the ﬁrm. Our starting point is the observation that, while standard valuation models assume that
ﬁnancing is frictionless, most real-world managers argue that raising funds in the capital markets
is often “too costly” (e.g., Graham and Harvey (2001)). Arguably, contracting and information
frictions indeed entail high additional costs to external ﬁnancing activities. Exposure to those costs
can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the way ﬁrms conduct their ﬁnancial and investment policies (Almeida et
al. (2004) and Faulkender and Petersen (2004)), giving rise to a “hedging motive” (cf. Froot,
1An incomplete list of papers in this literature includes Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Harford (1999), Opler,
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003), Harford, Mikkelson, and Partch
(2003), Mikkelson and Partch (2003), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2003),
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Faulkender and Wang (2005), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), and
Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2005).
1Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)). Building on this argument, we develop a theoretical framework in
which cash and debt policies are jointly determined within the ﬁrm’s investment problem, explicitly
identifying when cash is not the same as negative debt. By contrasting these conditions with a
benchmark case in which ﬁnancing is frictionless (and, hence, there is no hedging motive), we are able
to assess how ﬁrms optimally carry out both their cash and debt policies under ﬁnancial constraints.
It is easy to summarize our argument. In the absence of ﬁnancing frictions, ﬁrms’ future invest-
ment levels are independent of their current cash policies. Firms need not save internally to ﬁnance
future proﬁtable opportunities since all such opportunities will ﬁnd ﬁnancing in the capital markets.
Because of this independence, and in the absence of other costs/beneﬁts of carrying cash and debt,
for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁr m si ti sam a t t e ro fi n d i ﬀerence as to whether they use their excess
cash ﬂows to increase internal savings or to reduce debt. This policy choice has no value implications.
In sharp contrast, constrained ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial policies can be value-enhancing. Both higher cash
stocks and lower debt levels today increase a constrained ﬁrm’s future funding capacity and, thus,
its ability to undertake new investment opportunities. We show, however, that a trade-oﬀ guides
constrained ﬁrms’ choice between higher cash and lower debt. On the one hand, internal savings
are useful for investment optimization when ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms experience income short-
falls. In particular, in low cash ﬂow states, the eﬀect of cash on investment will be higher than the
corresponding eﬀect of lower debt (i.e., greater borrowing capacity). On the other hand, in states in
which cash ﬂows are high, higher cash balances will have a lower eﬀect on ﬁnancing capacity than
a corresponding reduction in outstanding debt. These key diﬀerential eﬀects of cash and debt on
future ﬁnancing capacity arise from the riskiness (or the state-contingency) of the debt obligation.
To wit, note that the current market value of risky debt is largely supported by future states of the
w o r l di nw h i c hc a s hﬂows are high. Accordingly, reducing the amount of outstanding debt by one
dollar today increases future debt capacity in good states by more than one dollar. By the same
token, reducing outstanding debt by one dollar today increases future debt capacity in bad states
by less than one dollar. In contrast, the marginal eﬀect of cash on investment is invariant across
states of the world: saving one additional dollar of cash today increases future ﬁnancing capacity
in all future states by exactly one dollar.
Our model shows that while cash holdings have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁnancing capacity and
investment spending in poor states of the world (low cash ﬂow states), debt reductions are a partic-
ularly eﬀective way of boosting investment in high cash ﬂow states. We use this trade-oﬀ to derive
testable predictions for how ﬁrms allocate free cash ﬂows across their cash and debt accounts. In
particular, we predict that a constrained ﬁrm will prefer saving cash (as opposed to reducing debt)
out of current cash ﬂow surpluses if the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities
is low, that is, if the constrained ﬁrm has “high hedging needs.” In contrast, if that correlation is
2high (“low hedging needs”), then the ﬁrm beneﬁts more from allocating its marginal dollar of free
cash ﬂow towards debt reductions (i.e., from “saving” future borrowing capacity).
Our analysis casts doubt on the standard view of cash as the negative of debt; a view that is
commonly used in corporate valuation. Cash and (negative) debt balances are not close substitutes
in a world where ﬁnancing is not frictionless. In particular, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms with high
hedging needs strictly prefer positive cash to negative debt; a preference that has value consequences.
For this type of ﬁrm, cash holdings play a signiﬁcant economic role because cash allows the ﬁrm to
bring future investment closer to eﬃcient levels, which maximizes value. In contrast, constrained
ﬁrms with low hedging needs value spare debt capacity; they prefer negative debt to positive cash.
Regarding unconstrained ﬁrms, our model’s prediction that they should be indiﬀerent between
various combinations of cash and debt policies suggests that, for these ﬁrms, cash could be viewed as
negative debt. However, we stress that the strict indeterminacy of cash and debt policies only holds
in the absence of other costs and beneﬁts that are unrelated to ﬁnancial constraints; such as the pos-
sibility that cash has a low yield, that cash can be diverted by managers, or that debt provides for tax
shields. As previous researchers have shown, such issues may very well inﬂuence corporate policies.
Importantly, though, even when unconstrained ﬁrms display systematic preferences towards cash
or debt, our constrained model can still be identiﬁed in the data. The reason is that unconstrained
ﬁrms’ choice between higher cash and lower debt today is independent of considerations about future
ﬁnancing capacity. The absence of a link between unconstrained ﬁrms’ policies and hedging needs
in turn provides us with an additional identiﬁcation restriction. To wit, while constrained ﬁrms’
propensity to allocate cash ﬂows towards cash or debt should depend on the correlation between their
cash ﬂows and investment opportunities, such a dependence should not exist for unconstrained ﬁrms.
In the second part of the paper we evaluate the extent to which our theory’s implications are
borne out in the data. In doing so, we look at a large sample of manufacturing ﬁrms over a three-
decade period (1971 through 2001). We estimate the simultaneous, within-ﬁrm responses of cash and
debt policies to cash ﬂow innovations for various subsamples p a r t i t i o n e db o t ho n( 1 )t h el i k e l i h o o d
that ﬁrms have constrained/unconstrained access to external capital and (2) measures of the corre-
lation between ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows and investment opportunities (“hedging needs”). We consider four
alternative ﬁrm characteristics in empirically identifying constrained and unconstrained subsamples:
(1) payout policy, (2) asset size, (3) bond ratings, and (4) commercial paper ratings. To measure
the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities, we look at a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow from
operations and either its industry-level (1) median R&D expenditures, (2) median three-years ahead
sales growth rates, or (3) changes in median Q.2 While the measures of ﬁnancial constraints that we
2The reason for using aggregate industry-level measures of investment opportunities is that such measures are ex-
ogenous to the individual ﬁrms’ internal cash ﬂow processes. Firm-level measures, in contrast, could be contaminated
by ﬁrms’ ability to undertake their investment opportunities and thus by the degree of ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints.
3use are quite standard, the measures of hedging needs are, to our knowledge, new to the literature.
We ﬁnd robust, coherent results for debt and cash management across all of our empirical mod-
els. First, unconstrained ﬁrms do not display a propensity to save cash out of cash ﬂows. Instead,
consistent with the bulk of the capital structure literature, they use free cash ﬂows towards reducing
the amount of debt that they carry. Crucially, as predicted by our model, this pattern holds irre-
spective of how unconstrained ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows correlate with investment opportunities. When we
then look at constrained ﬁrms, we ﬁnd markedly diﬀerent patterns in the way cash and debt poli-
cies are conducted. On average, constrained ﬁr m sd on o tu s ee x c e s sc a s hﬂows to reduce debt, but
instead prefer using those inﬂows to boost cash holdings. More important, we ﬁnd that constrained
ﬁrms’ propensities to reduce debt and to increase cash are strongly inﬂuenced by the correlation
between their cash ﬂows and their investment opportunities. In other words, hedging needs seem to
drive large cross-sectional diﬀerences in the optimal balance between cash and debt policies among
constrained ﬁrms. To wit, when their hedging needs are low, constrained ﬁrms behave somewhat
similarly to unconstrained ﬁrms: they show a propensity to use excess cash ﬂows to reduce the
amount of debt they carry into future periods, and display a relatively weaker (largely insigniﬁcant)
cash ﬂow sensitivity of cash savings. When constrained ﬁrms have high hedging needs, however,
they display a strong preference for saving cash (their cash ﬂow sensitivity of cash is positive and
highly signiﬁcant), while showing no propensity to reduce debt. These results are fully consistent
with the predictions of our model.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature, and it is important that we establish the
marginal contribution of our analysis. We have brieﬂy discussed the literature on cash policies. The
main contribution of our paper to that literature is that we model both cash and debt policies within
an integrated framework. We isolate theoretically and empirically one element that aﬀects the cash
and debt policies of ﬁrms facing imperfect capital markets – namely, the inter-temporal relation
between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities – and use this wedge to identify the cash—debt
policy interplay. This approach is new to the literature on corporate liquidity management.
Our paper is also related to the literature on corporate hedging. In particular, the notion that
costly external ﬁnance gives rise to a hedging motive was originally developed in the inﬂuential
study of Froot et al. (1993).3 Our contribution to the hedging literature is two-fold. First, we
develop and test a model that shows how ﬁrms can use both their cash and debt policies as hedging
tools. As discussed by Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000), while the hedging literature has focused
on the use of derivative instruments, in practice, ﬁrms use alternative means of hedging that involve
3We note that prior studies have proposed various alternative motivations for hedging, including tax convexity
(Smith and Stulz (1985)), debt capacity and associated tax shields (Leland (1998) and Stulz (1996)), managerial
risk-aversion (Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985)), costs of ﬁnancial distress (Smith and Stulz (1985)), and
information issues (DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1991)). Empirical work testing these hypotheses includes Tufano (1996),
Haushalter (2001), and Graham and Rogers (2002). See Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) for a survey of the literature.
4both ﬁnancial and operating strategies. In this vein, our paper proposes that the cash—debt inter-
play represents a new dimension researchers can explore in examining corporate hedging. Second,
we report empirical results supporting the view that ﬁnancial constraints indeed create incentives
for hedging. Previous attempts to test Froot et al.’s theory have focused on the use of ﬁnancial
derivatives and generally yielded mixed results.4
Our empirical approach also relates to the current capital structure literature in that we focus on
companies’ marginal ﬁnancing decisions (debt issuance and repurchase activities) in order to learn
about ﬁnancial policy-making. Examples of recent papers that use this approach are Shyam-Sunder
and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), and Lemmon and Zender (2004). These papers are
concerned with a ﬁrm’s choice between debt and equity in the face of an internal “ﬁnancing deﬁcit”
whose calculation takes cash holdings as exogenous. In contrast to those studies, our analysis
endogenizes cash holdings, focusing on the cash versus debt margin.
Finally, our study is also related to the large literature on the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on
corporate policies (see Hubbard (1998) for a review). While earlier studies in that literature focused
on ﬁrms’ physical investments and other real expenditures, a few recent papers analyze the impact
of constraints on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial policies (e.g., Almeida et al. (2004) and Faulkender and Petersen
(2004)). We contribute to this latter line of research by suggesting an additional ﬁnancial decision
that is directly aﬀected by capital markets frictions: the choice between saving and borrowing.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out a model of cash—debt sub-
stitutability in the presence of ﬁnancing constraints and derive its empirical predictions. Section
3 describes our empirical methods and presents our main ﬁndings. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Appendix A contains the proofs. Appendices B and C present extensions of our basic model.
2 The Model
We model the optimal ﬁnancial policy of a ﬁrm that has proﬁtable growth opportunities in the
future but that might face limited access to external capital when funding those opportunities. In
maximizing investment value, the ﬁrm’s main ﬁnancial policy variables are cash and debt. The
admittedly simple structure of the model is meant to capture the essential elements of our theory
of ﬁnancial management under ﬁnancing constraints.
4Papers with evidence that speak to the link between ﬁnancial constraints and hedging include Nance, Smith,
and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), Gay and Nam, (1998), and Guay (1999).
As discussed by Vickery (2004), the bulk of the evidence suggests that, contrary to expectations, the use of ﬁnancial
derivatives is concentrated in large (likely unconstrained) companies. In addition, even for large public companies
the magnitude of derivatives hedging seems to be very small (see Guay and Kothari (2003)).
52.1 Structure
2.1.1 Assets and Technologies
The model has three dates. The ﬁrm starts the model at date 0 with assets in place that will produce
cash ﬂows at date 2.T h i sc a s hﬂow c2 is random from the perspective of date 0.A td a t e1,t h eﬁrm
learns additional information regarding c2. With probability p,t h eﬁrm gets a positive signal about
c2 (state H). In this case, the ﬁrm learns that the cash ﬂow will be high (cH). With probability
(1 − p),t h eﬁrm gets a negative signal (state L). In state L, there is some residual uncertainty
regarding cash ﬂows. With probability q ∈ (0,1), c2 equals cH, and with probability (1−q), c2 equals
cL <c H.W el e tc =[ qcH +( 1− q)cL] denote the expected cash ﬂow in state L.W ea s s u m et h a t
the cash ﬂow c2 is produced entirely by assets that are already in place at date 0. In other words,
the ﬁrm has no investment opportunity available at that initial date. In Appendix B, we introduce
ad a t e0 investment opportunity in the model structure and show that our analysis carries over.
The ﬁrm has an existing amount of internal funds at date 0,e q u a lt oc0 > 0, and a future
investment opportunity that will be available at date 1. At that date, the ﬁrm can make an
additional investment I, which produces output equal to g(I) at date 2. Whether the ﬁrm has a
proﬁtable growth opportunity at date 1 depends on the distribution of cash ﬂows from assets in the
following way. If the ﬁrm gets a positive signal about cash ﬂows (state H), then the ﬁrm will have
an investment opportunity with probability φ<1; with probability (1 − φ) there is no investment
opportunity. If the ﬁrm gets a negative signal (state L), then the probability that the ﬁrm has an
investment opportunity is equal to (1−φ), while with probability φ there is no additional investment.
In our setting, the parameter φ captures the correlation between cash ﬂows from existing assets
and future investment opportunities – this is in the spirit of Froot et al. (1993). When φ = 1
2,t h e
ﬁrm has the same probability of having proﬁtable investment in either state; that is, the correlation
between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is zero. When φ>1
2, that correlation is positive
because the ﬁrm is more likely to have proﬁtable investments when cash ﬂows are high.
To simplify the analysis, we take that the uncertainty about date 2 cash ﬂows in state L is only
resolved at date 2. For the same reason, we also assume that, conditional on being in state L,t h e
realization of the investment opportunity is uncorrelated with the date 2 realization of cash ﬂows
from assets in place. The time line of the model is presented in Figure 1.
2.1.2 Financing and Limited Pledgeability
We consider a ﬁr mr u nb yam a n a g e r( e n t r e p r e n e u r )w i t hs ome debt in its capital structure. The
manager and the creditors are assumed to be risk-neutral. The ﬁrm starts the model with an ex-
ogenous amount of debt with face value equal to d2. This face value is due at date 2.W ec o n s i d e r
that existing creditors cannot access the cash ﬂows produced by the new investment opportunity,
6• Creditors are paid, 
residual kept by firm. 
• Cash flow from assets 
is observed.
• Project opportunity, if 
any, is observed.
• New financing is 
raised, if required.
c0
• Redeem ∆ units 
of existing debt.
•C a r r y  ( c0- ∆) as 







cH+ g(IH) - IH
cH
cH+ g(IL) - IL
cL+ g(IL) - IL
cH
cL
• All cash flows are 
realized.
• A fraction τ of date-2 
cash flows is pledgeable 
to creditors.












• Creditors are paid, 
residual kept by firm. 
• Cash flow from assets 
is observed.
• Project opportunity, if 
any, is observed.
• New financing is 
raised, if required.
c0
• Redeem ∆ units 
of existing debt.
•C a r r y  ( c0- ∆) as 







cH+ g(IH) - IH
cH
cH+ g(IL) - IL
cL+ g(IL) - IL
cH
cL
• All cash flows are 
realized.
• A fraction τ of date-2 
cash flows is pledgeable 
to creditors.












• Cash flow from assets 
is observed.
• Project opportunity, if 
any, is observed.
• New financing is 
raised, if required.
c0
• Redeem ∆ units 
of existing debt.
•C a r r y  ( c0- ∆) as 







cH+ g(IH) - IH
cH
cH+ g(IL) - IL
cL+ g(IL) - IL
cH
cL
• All cash flows are 
realized.
• A fraction τ of date-2 
cash flows is pledgeable 
to creditors.























Figure 1: Basic model time line
g(I). Existing debt is then backed entirely by the cash ﬂow from assets c2, and potentially by the
cash reserves that the ﬁrm chooses to carry from date 0 into the future (see discussion below).5 At
date 0,t h eﬁrm can change the amount of debt that it carries into future periods. It can either
increase debt by issuing additional claims against future cash ﬂows, or reduce debt by using current
cash reserves to redeem some of its existing obligations. The amount of change in debt is captured
by the parameter ∆, which can be greater than zero (debt reduction) or smaller than zero (issuance
of new debt). After a debt reduction/issuance initiative, the face value of debt changes to dN
2 .W e
will determine below the relationship between dN
2 , ∆,a n dd2.
Besides debt reduction/issuance, the ﬁrm chooses at date 0 how much cash to carry into date 1.
The level of cash retained is equal to c1 = c0−∆.T h eﬁrm can raise new ﬁnancing at date 1 backed
by existing assets or by the new investment opportunity. If dN
2 is such that there is additional debt
capacity from existing assets, then these assets can support more external ﬁnance. Also, the ﬁrm can
raise more ﬁnance by pledging the cash ﬂows g(I). We denote the amount of new ﬁnancing at date 1
by B1. The risk-free rate is normalized to zero and all new ﬁnancing is assumed to be fairly priced.
We make three assumptions concerning the pledgeability of ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and cash reserves:
5The assumption that old debtholders cannot assess the cash ﬂows from the new investment is simply meant to
eliminate concerns with debt overhang (Myers (1977)). Note that because existing debt is backed by cash ﬂows that
do not depend on the payoﬀso fd a t e1 investment, at date 1 the ﬁr mh a sn oi n c e n t i v e st ou n d e r t a k en e g a t i v eN P V
investments that transfer value away from creditors.
7Assumption I The ﬁrm can only pledge a fraction τ of the cash ﬂows that both the existing assets
and the new investment opportunity produce.
This limited pledgeability assumption is justiﬁed under various contracting frameworks. It
arises, for example, from the inalienability of human capital (Hart and Moore (1994)). To wit,
entrepreneurs cannot contractually commit never to leave the ﬁrm. This leaves open the possibility
that an entrepreneur will use the threat of withdrawing his human capital to renegotiate the agreed
upon payments. If the entrepreneur’s human capital is essential to the project, he will get a fraction
of the cash ﬂows. Limited pledgeability is also an implication of the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
model of moral hazard in project choice. When project choice cannot be speciﬁed contractually,
investors must leave a high enough fraction of the payoﬀ to entrepreneurs so as to induce them to
choose the project with highest potential proﬁtability.








where c2 is either equal to c (state L)o rcH (state H). Because of this quantity constraint, the ﬁrm
might not be able to undertake its investment opportunities to their optimal extent.
Assumption II If the ﬁrm has an investment opportunity at date 1, then it can use all of its cash
to invest.
This assumption means that the ﬁrm has priority over the use of cash in case there is an in-
vestment opportunity available at date 1. We stress that this contractual feature is optimal in our
framework: using the cash at date 1 to repay debt is a “zero NPV project,” while investing the
cash in the ﬁrm is positive NPV if the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained.
Despite the optimality of this contracting assumption within our framework, we acknowledge
that in the real world debt covenants might limit investment. The possibility that existing creditors
might capture a fraction of cash reserves even when the ﬁrm has positive NPV investments available
will decrease ﬁrms’ incentives to hold cash. However, the incentives to hold cash will only disappear
if creditors always have strict priority over the entire s t o c ko fc a s ho ft h eﬁr m .T h i si si m p l a u s i b l e
in practice. Debt covenants regarding the use of cash for investment should bind more strictly if the
ﬁrm is close to default. However, in our model, the ﬁrm is not in default in state L (since q>0).
The assumption that creditors cannot capture cash reserves is less tenable in states in which
there is no investment opportunity. Accordingly, we assume that:
Assumption III If the cash reserve c1 is not employed toward investments at date 1,t h e na
fraction τC ∈ [0,1] o ft h ec a s hr e s e r v ec a nb ec l a i m e db yt h ee x i s t i n gc r e d i t o r si nc a s et h ec a s hﬂow
c2 i sn o te n o u g ht or e p a yt h e i rp r o m i s e dp a y m e n tdN
2 .
8In analogy to the parameter τ, one can think of τC as measuring the pledgeability of cash stocks.
In order to make our points in a parsimonious fashion, we assume for now that:
Assumption IIIA τC =0 , that is, creditors cannot access the ﬁrm’s cash balances.
We relax this assumption in Section 2.3.1, making it clear that our results hold irrespective of τC.
2.2 Solution
We solve the model backwards starting at date 1. At this date, the ﬁrm chooses optimal invest-
ment and new ﬁnancing levels for given amounts of cash and debt. Then, given expected future
investment choices, the ﬁrm chooses the optimal cash and debt redemption policies at date 0.
2.2.1 Date 1 Investment Choice
If there is no investment opportunity, then the ﬁrm has no relevant choice to make. For our pur-
poses, the interesting case is the one in which the ﬁrm has an investment opportunity. In this
case, the optimal date 1 behavior amounts to determining the value-maximizing investment levels,
subject to the relevant budget and ﬁnancing constraints. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm solves the following
program at each relevant state of nature given ∆, d
N
2 , and the realization of c2:
max
I
g(I) − I s.t.







The ﬁnancing available to the ﬁrm consists of (i) c0−∆, the cash holdings of the ﬁrm; (ii) τg(I),t h e







, the spare debt capacity (if any) from cash ﬂows of the existing project.
We deﬁne IFB,t h eﬁrst-best investment level, as:
g0(IFB)=1 . (3)
If the ﬁnancial constraint (2) is satisﬁed at IFB,t h eﬁrm invests IFB. Otherwise, it invests the value
that exactly satisﬁes (2). In the latter case, we have g
0
(I) > 1.6 We shall denote this constrained
investment level as IL(∆) for state L and as IH(∆) for state H; where we emphasize the dependence
on ∆, the debt reduction parameter. These investment levels can be used to characterize the ﬁrm
ﬁnancial constraints:
6Clearly, a necessary condition for the problem to be reasonable is that a reduction in investment relaxes the
constraint, that is, τg
0
(I) < 1 for any I that is less than I
FB. Otherwise, it may be possible for the ﬁrm to self-ﬁnance
the new investment opportunity and it may never be constrained – the ﬁnancial constraint could be relaxed by
simply increasing investment.
9Deﬁnition A ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained if investment is below the ﬁrst-best level in at least one
state of nature. A ﬁrm is ﬁnancially unconstrained when investment is at the ﬁrst-best level in all
states of nature.
2.2.2 Date 0 Cash and Debt Policies
We now determine whether the ﬁrm is better oﬀ retaining cash or repaying debt at date 0.T h e
date 0 ﬁnancial policy can be subsumed in the optimal choice of ∆, which determines both the face
value of debt d
N
2 and the level of cash retained for the future, c1 = c0 − ∆.
Market Values of Debt The ﬁrst step is to determine how debt reduction, ∆,a ﬀects the face
value of debt, d
N
2 . We make the following assumption about the level of debt before repayment:
τcL ≤ d2 ≤ τcH. (4)
The assumption that d2 ≤ τcH is without loss of generality, since any amount of debt bigger
than τcH is incompatible with limited pledgeability and can thus be ignored. The lower bound on
the debt level means that the initial debt of the ﬁrm is risky. That is, in state H,t h eﬁrm’s debt
is certain to be paid oﬀ in full, but in state L, there is residual uncertainty about a full payment
on debt. In state L, with probability q, the debt will be paid fully, and with remaining probability
1 − q, the debt will be in default. This uncertainty gets resolved only at date 2.V i e w e df r o md a t e
0 standpoint, the likelihood of no default on the ﬁrm’s debt is given by p∗ =[ p +( 1− p)q].
The market value of existing debt is equal to
D0 = p∗d2 +( 1− p∗)min[τcL,d 2] ≥ τcL. (5)
If the ﬁrm wants to reduce its existing debt level (that is, to make dN
2 <d 2), it must repurchase out-
standing debt that is currently held by creditors. We stress, however, that the strict need to repur-
c h a s eo n l ya r i s e sb e c a u s ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eﬁrm has no need for funds at date 0.I np a r t i c u -
lar, we show in Appendix B that in a set up with date 0 investment it is not necessary to model repur-
chases at all. In that case, the ﬁrm chooses between issuing more or less debt at date 0, given the cur-
rent and the future need for funds, and given the trade-oﬀ between cash and negative debt. Our the-
ory’s results should thus be seen as independent of the particular model of repurchases that follows.
To model debt reduction via repurchases, we assume that the ﬁrm’s debt is competitively priced
in credit markets. In this case, the new face value of debt dN
2 (∆) must be such that the creditors
10are indiﬀerent between whether or not to tender debt:7
DN
0 = D0 − ∆. (6)
Given competitive debt pricing, we can show that:
dN
2 = d2 −
∆
p∗,i fτcL <d N
2 (7)
= D0 − ∆,i fτcL ≥ dN
2 .
Notice that Eq. (7) also gives the new face value of debt when ∆ < 0; i.e., when the ﬁrm wishes to
issue additional debt. The minimum possible value of ∆ is such that τcH = dN
2 ,a n d∆ cannot be
higher than either the market value of existing debt, D0,o rt h eﬁrm’s total internal funds, c0:
∆min ≡− [p∗τcH +( 1− p∗)τcL − D0] ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆max =m i n ( c0,D 0). (8)










L(∆) are the investment levels that obtain for each choice of ∆. Speciﬁcally, if ∆ is
such that the ﬁrst-best investment level is feasible for a given state s,t h e nI∗
s(∆)=IFB.O t h e r w i s e ,
I∗
s(∆) is equal to Is(∆) as determined in Section 2.2.1 (by the ﬁnancial constraint, Eq. (2)).
Before we characterize the optimal solution, it is useful to understand intuitively what is accom-
plished by the choice of ﬁnancial policy. The key intuition is established by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let e ∆ be deﬁned by e ∆ =[ D0 −τcL].F o r∆ < e ∆, IH(∆) is strictly increasing in ∆ and
IL(∆) is strictly decreasing in ∆.F o r∆ ≥ e ∆, IH(∆) and IL(∆) are independent of ∆.
In words, debt reduction at date 0 is associated with a trade-oﬀ in the future choice of invest-
ment. If a ﬁrm chooses to reduce debt, it can increase investment in the state of nature in which
cash ﬂows are high (state H). However, this decreases feasible investment in state L. Thus, state-L
investment increases with the level of cash balances (c0 − ∆)t h a tt h eﬁrm carries to the future.
The intuition is as follows. If the face value of existing debt is higher than the pledgeable cash
ﬂows in state L,t h e nt h ev a l u eo fd e b ta td a t e0 is supported mostly by state-H cash ﬂows. Ac-
cordingly, if the ﬁrm decides to use one unit of date 0 cash to reduce outstanding debt, it reduces
the promised payment for state H by more than one unit (since p∗ < 1, see Eq. (7)). As a result,
state-H ﬁnancing capacity goes up even though the ﬁrm carries one less unit of cash until date 1.
7An implication of competitive pricing is that if debt reduction enhances ﬁrm value, then this value will be
captured by the ﬁrm. Importantly, we note that allowing creditors to capture a fraction of the NPV of redemption,
so long as they do not capture the entire NPV, does not aﬀect the nature of our conclusions.
11If the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained in state H,t h i se ﬀect increases state-H investment. By the
same token, debt capacity in state L goes up by less than one unit, and feasible state-L investment
goes down because the ﬁrm has less cash.
The cut-oﬀ level e ∆ represents the maximum amount of debt that can be repaid before debt
becomes riskless. Once debt is riskless, the debt repayment has no eﬀect on ﬁnancing capacity.
However, debt issues, which are feasible when ∆min < 0,i n c r e a s eﬁnancing capacity in state L at
the expense of state H even when current debt is riskless.
We can now state and prove the central result of our theory.
Proposition 1 The optimal ﬁnancial policy depends on the degree of ﬁnancial constraints and on
the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities as follows:
• If the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially unconstrained, it is indiﬀerent between all possible ∆ in the [∆min, b ∆]
range, where b ∆ is either equal to ∆max,o rt ot h ev a l u eo f ∆ that renders the ﬁrm ﬁnancially
constrained in state L.A n yv a l u eo f∆ > b ∆, if feasible, yields a lower value for the ﬁrm;
• If the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained for all ∆, then the optimal ﬁnancial policy depends on
the parameter φ:
a. If φ ≤ 1
2, the optimal policy is to choose ∆∗ = ∆min;
b. There exists a threshold level φ, satisfying 1
2 < φ<1, such that
(i) For φ ≤ φ, the optimal policy is to choose ∆∗ ≤ 0,
(ii) For φ>φ , the optimal policy is to choose ∆∗ > 0;
c. There exists a second threshold level φ, satisfying φ<φ<1, such that for φ>φ the
optimal policy is to choose ∆∗ =m i n (e ∆,∆max).
In words, Proposition 1 suggests that unconstrained ﬁrms should be indiﬀerent between using
current internal funds to increase cash holdings or to reduce debt. In contrast, ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms should display a clear preference for holding cash or reducing debt, depending on the
correlation between cash ﬂows from assets and new investment opportunities. If this correlation is
zero or negative (φ ≤ 1
2), the optimal policy is to increase investment in state L as much as possible.
This is accomplished by making ∆ equal to the lowest possible value, ∆min, which might involve
additional debt issues when ∆min < 0.I na n yc a s e ,t h eﬁrm has a preference towards carrying cash
into the future. Furthermore, as long as the correlation is low enough (φ ≤ φ), the ﬁrm continues
to prefer carrying cash to date 1 (∆∗ ≤ 0). However, if the correlation is high (φ>φ), the optimal



















Figure 2: Optimal ﬁnancial policy of a constrained ﬁrm
f o rv e r yh i g hc o r r e l a t i o nv a l u e s( φ>φ), the constrained ﬁrm should use its current internal funds
to reduce debt as much as possible, until it either exhausts its internal funds (∆∗ = ∆max), or it
completely eliminates the risk of debt (∆∗ = e ∆).8 These eﬀects are depicted in Figure 2.
In order to understand our policy results, consider ﬁrst the case in which the correlation between
cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is zero (i.e., φ = 1
2 )a n dt h eﬁrm is constrained. In this case,
the (ex ante) productivity of the ﬁrm’s investment is the same in both states. Because the production
function is concave, the optimal investment policy involves equalizing investment levels across states.
But since ﬁnancing capacity is always higher in state H, the constrained ﬁrm beneﬁts from increasing
capacity in state L as much as possible. This is accomplished by making cash holdings as high as
possible (∆ = ∆min), that is, by issuing as much additional debt as is feasible and carrying the
new ﬁnancing raised as cash reserves. If φ<1
2 it is even more desirable to increase investment in
state L. However, as the correlation parameter φ increases, it becomes more likely that the ﬁrm
will need funds in state H because expected productivity in that state goes up. At high levels of
φ, equalization of the marginal productivity of investment across states requires debt reduction.
It is worth noting that the eﬀect of the likelihood of default (1 − p∗) on the optimal amount of
debt redemption ∆∗ is not clear-cut. Recall that p∗ =[ p+(1−p)q]. We show formally in the proof
of Proposition 1 that ∆∗ is increasing in p, but that the eﬀect of q on ∆∗ is ambiguous, making the
8To derive Proposition 1, we have assumed that the parameters are such that a constrained ﬁrm is constrained for all
possible values of ∆. Given the results in Lemmas 1 and 2, a suﬃcient condition for this is that the ﬁrm is constrained
in state H for ∆ = ∆max. Because investment in state H increases with ∆, it is possible that for a large value of ∆
(call it ∆unc) the constrained ﬁrm becomes unconstrained in state H, while still constrained in state L.I nt h i sc a s e ,
it can no longer be optimal for the ﬁrm to increase debt repayments beyond ∆unc. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 would
also hold in this case, with the additional condition that the optimal debt repayment amount ∆
∗ is lower than ∆unc.
13overall eﬀect of p∗ on ∆∗ ambiguous (see Appendix A). A high p implies that the ﬁrm is more likely
t oe n du pi ns t a t eH, where the beneﬁts of debt reduction will be realized in the form of freed-up debt
capacity. In addition, for a given ∆, p reduces feasible investment in state H (because debt repay-
ment has a smaller eﬀect on state-H ﬁnancing capacity if p is high), thereby increasing the marginal
productivity of investment in that state. Similarly, an increase in q will also increase the marginal
productivity of investment in state H. However, as q increases, debt reduction becomes a less ef-
fective way of transferring resources to state H, since a part of these resources also get transferred
to the high cash ﬂow state emanating from state L (in which investment funds are not needed).
To sum up, in our model the optimality of debt reduction for a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm
depends crucially on φ, the correlation between investment opportunities and cash ﬂows, but not
necessarily on the likelihood of default of the ﬁrm. In contrast, a ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm can
achieve ﬁrst-best investment levels irrespective of ﬁnancial policy, and thus small changes in ∆ have
no eﬀect on investment and value. The only policy that is suboptimal for an unconstrained ﬁrm is
to reduce cash holdings so much that the ﬁrm becomes constrained in state L (cf. Proposition 1).
Our model yields comparative statics results that naturally lend themselves to empirical testing.
We present and discuss these comparative statics in turn.
Proposition 2 Suppose the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained for all ∆. We obtain the following eﬀects
on the ﬁrm’s cash and debt policies from a variation in the availability of internal funds, c0:
• If the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is low (φ ≤ 1
2),t h e na
change in c0 should result in a corresponding change in the ﬁrm’s cash balances (∂c1
∂c0 > 0),
b u tn o ti nt h ea m o u n to fd e b to u t s t a n d i n g(∂∆
∂c0 =0 ) .
• If the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is high (φ>φ),t h e na
change in c0 should change the amount of debt outstanding (∂∆
∂c0 > 0),b u tn o tt h eﬁrm’s cash
balances (∂c1
∂c0 =0 ) .
These comparative statics results follow directly from the optimal policies characterized in
Proposition 1. If the correlation φ is low, then the ﬁrm does not beneﬁtf r o md e b tr e p a y m e n t .
Consequently, increases (decreases) in internal funds result in increases (decreases) in the amount
of cash balances held by the ﬁrm. For very high correlation levels, however, the ﬁrm’s optimal
policy is such that it beneﬁts more from debt repayments than from holding cash. In this range,
changes in internal funds lead to same-direction changes in debt levels.9
9For intermediate correlation levels (φ ∈ (
1
2,φ)), the ﬁrm is in an equilibrium in which internal funds are split
between debt repayments/issues and cash balances (cf. Proposition 1). In this range, intuition would suggest that
an increase in cash ﬂows would lead both to an increase in cash (
∂c1
∂c0 > 0) and to a smaller increase (or a higher
142.3 Robustness
In order to derive Propositions 1 and 2 in a parsimonious fashion, we assumed that cash reserves are
not pledgeable to creditors (Assumption IIIA). We now revert to the case with general τC (Assump-
tion III) in order to illustrate the robustness of the conclusions drawn under our basic model. In
addition, we also show that our results carry over to a setting in which the ﬁrm makes investments
at date 0 as well as at date 1.
2.3.1 Making Cash Reserves Pledgeable
Our results also extend to a setting in which we allow creditors to have priority over the ﬁrm’s cash
reserves at date 2. Admittedly, while it simpliﬁes our analysis, assuming that creditors cannot seize
the ﬁrm’s cash reserves at date 2 is somewhat unappealing. Accordingly, in this section we revert As-
sumption IIIA to its general case in Assumption III, essentially allowing τC to be greater than zero.
In doing this, we continue to assume that ﬁrms can always tap their cash reserves at date 1 if invest-
ment opportunities arise – as we argued earlier, this is an optimal contracting outcome in our model.
Allowing τC > 0 alters the market-values of debt, and, in turn, the expression for the new face
value of debt, dN
2 , after a debt reduction of amount ∆ at the market price. If their claim is in
default at date 2, creditors can access a fraction τ of the cash ﬂow cL as well as a fraction τC of
the cash reserve c1, provided that the cash reserve c1 was not deployed for investments at date 1.
The market value of existing debt is then given by
D0 = p∗d2 +( 1− p∗)
£
(1 − φ)min(τcL,d 2)+φmin(τcL + τCc1,d 2)
¤
. (10)
Existing debt is in default with probability (1 −p∗). Because all default events happen in state
L, the probability that arrival of an investment opportunity is subsequently followed by default is
(1−p∗)(1−φ). In this case, creditors can only access the cash ﬂow cL. With probability (1−p∗)φ
the ﬁrm is in default at date 2 and no investment was made at date 1. In this case, creditors can
also access the cash reserve c1.
After a debt reduction of amount ∆, the new face value of debt dN





2 +( 1− p∗)
£
(1 − φ)min(τcL,d N




These equations imply that in contrast to our earlier analysis, the relationship between dN
2 and
d2 must be speciﬁed over three regions: a region of “small” debt reductions, a region of “moderately
reduction) in debt (
∂∆
∂c0 > 0). Nevertheless, the precise change in ﬁnancial policies depends also on the rate of change
of the marginal productivities following a change in cash ﬂows – the comparative statics are less clear in this range.
Proposition 2 focuses on correlation ranges for which implications are clear-cut.
15large” debt reductions, and another of “large” debt reductions. In particular, we obtain
dN
2 = d2 −
∆
p∗,i fτcL <τc L + τCc1 <d N
2 (12)
= d2 −
(1 − p∗)φ[d2 − τcL − τCc0]
[p∗ +( 1− p∗)φ]
−
[1 + (1 − p∗)φτc]∆
[p∗ +( 1− p∗)φ]
,
if τcL <d N
2 <τc L + τCc1
= D0 − ∆,i fτcL ≥ dN
2 .
The ﬁrst and the third cases correspond respectively to “small” ∆ and “large” ∆, and are similar
to the case we analyzed before. In the “moderately large” ∆ region, it can be veriﬁed that dN
2 <d 2
for ∆ > 0,a n dt h a tdN
2 is decreasing in ∆ at a rate that is greater than one. So long as this property
holds, the analysis remains qualitatively identical to that in the basic model. This property implies
that IH(∆) is increasing in ∆, and thus that Propositions 1 and 2 also hold. In particular, the
conclusion that IH(∆) is increasing in ∆ holds irrespective of the value of τC. We can state that
the speciﬁc value of τC is qualitatively irrelevant for the results of our model.
2.3.2 Date 0 Investment
We also solve a version of our model in which we introduce a date 0 investment opportunity. Our
basic model assumes that the ﬁrm has no alternative use for its internal resources, and thus it
allocates the currently available internal funds (c0) entirely towards cash or (lower) debt. This
assumption simpliﬁes the exposition of our theory; in particular, it allows us to focus directly on
the marginal trade-oﬀ between cash and negative debt. However, one cannot generally assume that
date 0 investment is exogenous to the ﬁnancial policy problem solved above. Unlike the direct
extension in Section 2.3.1, the analysis of date 0 investment is more involved. Thus, for the sake of
brevity, we relegate the solution details to Appendix B.
A speciﬁc feature of our model that we highlight here is that it does not require any assumptions
regarding debt repurchases (see Section 2.2.2 above). In this modiﬁed set up, if the constrained
ﬁrm wishes to carry less debt into the future it will simply issue less debt today. In particular, the
notion of “negative debt” does not necessarily entail active debt redemption as in the simple model
that we present in the main text.
As Appendix B shows, our previous conclusions carry over to this modiﬁed set up. The cor-
relation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities continues to determine the cash versus
negative debt aspect of the constrained ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy. In particular, we show that if hedg-
ing needs are high, then it is optimal for the constrained ﬁrm to carry high cash balances into the
future. For instance, the ﬁrm issues debt at date 0 not just to fund the date 0 investment but to
also build up cash reserves. As hedging needs decrease, it becomes optimal for the constrained ﬁrm
16to save debt capacity for future good states of the world. As a result, the ﬁrm uses cash reserves
to fund date 0 investment, and, in turn, also issues less debt at date 0. These results are exactly in
the spirit of Proposition 1 above.
In addition, we obtain comparative statics results that resemble, but not identical to those in
Proposition 2. The new result in this extension is that if hedging needs are high, cash ﬂow sensitiv-
ities of debt are actually predicted to be positive, instead of zero as in Proposition 2. As we explain
in detail in the appendix, the intuition is that higher cash ﬂows allow the constrained ﬁrm to invest
more at date 0, and because debt capacity is linked to investment returns, the ﬁrm can also borrow
a greater amount at that date (a multiplier eﬀect). Hence, it is not only the case that constrained
ﬁrms with high hedging needs should not use current cash ﬂows to reduce outstanding debt, but
they could actually display a positive relationship between cash ﬂows and current net debt issues.
2.4 Empirical Implications
Our theory’s key empirical implications concern how constrained ﬁrms should allocate cash ﬂows
into cash and debt balances. As we have emphasized, this dimension of ﬁnancial policy is governed
by a hedging motive – captured by the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities
under constrained ﬁnancing. We can summarize our model’s implications as follows:
Implication 1 If the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is low (the ﬁrm
has high hedging needs), then constrained ﬁrms allocate their “free” operating cash ﬂows pri-
marily into cash balances. Their propensity to use cash ﬂows towards debt reduction is small.
Hence, these ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow sensitivity of cash, deﬁned as the fraction of excess cash ﬂow
allocated to cash holdings, should be positive. In addition, their cash ﬂow sensitivity of debt,
deﬁned as the eﬀect of cash ﬂows on outstanding debt, should not be signiﬁcantly negative. In
fact, cash ﬂow sensitivities of debt could be positive for these ﬁrms, because of the multiplier
eﬀect mentioned in Section 2.3.2.
Implication 2 If the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is high (low
hedging needs), then constrained ﬁrms should display a relatively weaker propensity to save
cash, and a stronger propensity to use current cash ﬂows to reduce debt. Hence, these ﬁrms’
cash ﬂow sensitivity of debt should be more negative, while their cash ﬂow sensitivity of cash
should be less positive than those of ﬁrms with high hedging needs.
Notice that the theory has less clear implications for the average level of the cash ﬂow sensi-
tivities of cash and debt for constrained ﬁrms. Because constrained ﬁrms have an incentive to save
ﬁnancing capacity for the future, intuition suggests that the cash ﬂow sensitivity of cash (debt)
17should generally be positive (negative). However, our theory implies that one might observe dif-
ferent sensitivity patterns depending on the distribution of hedging needs in the sample. We shall
look at these issues in the empirical section.
A relevant observation is that the prediction that the cash ﬂow sensitivity of debt should be
negative for some constrained ﬁrms does not imply that such ﬁrms must redeem debt. As discussed
in Section 2.3.2, the basic model’s prediction that some constrained ﬁrms use cash ﬂows to redeem
debt might translate into a propensity to reduce the amount of debt that the ﬁrm currently issues.
In other words, on net terms, the ﬁrm may or may not display positive debt issuance activities, yet
those activities should fall in response to cash ﬂow innovations.
Regarding unconstrained ﬁrms, our benchmark model predicts that their cash and debt policies
should not necessarily relate to cash ﬂow surpluses, or to their hedging needs. In the strictest sense,
unconstrained ﬁrms do not have any need to hedge in our model. Nevertheless, to facilitate com-
parisons, we also use the term “high and low hedging needs” for unconstrained ﬁrms depending on
whether the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is low or high, respectively.
Note also that the strict indeterminacy of ﬁnancial policies for unconstrained ﬁrms in our model
only holds in the absence of other costs and beneﬁts of cash and debt. We show in Appendix C that
in the presence of an additional cost of carrying cash, unconstrained ﬁrms will generally prefer to
use excess cash ﬂows to reduce debt instead of adding more cash to their balance sheets. Likewise,
in the presence of an additional beneﬁt of holding cash (or a beneﬁt to carrying debt), unconstrained
ﬁrms will prefer saving cash as opposed to reducing debt. Crucially, because these additional costs
and beneﬁts are orthogonal to the ﬁnancing constraints rationale that we use to derive Propositions
1 and 2, we also show that they do not change the nature of the results derived for constrained ﬁrms.
For example, if there is an additional cost of carrying cash, constrained ﬁrms’ hedging needs have to
be higher in order to induce them to save cash. This eﬀect only changes the particular value of the
correlation cut-oﬀ φ below which constrained ﬁrms prefer to hold cash, not our comparative statics.
Finally, notice that because unconstrained ﬁrms do not need to worry about future ﬁnancing
capacity, their cash and debt policies lack a hedging motive. In practical terms, this implies that
irrespective of the levels of the cash ﬂow sensitivities of cash and debt one might observe for
unconstrained ﬁrms, these sensitivities should not depend on the correlation between cash ﬂows and
investment opportunities. This insight provides us with a way to identify our model irrespective of
the average levels of cash ﬂow sensitivities that we observe for constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms.
We summarize the above considerations in an additional implication.
Implication 3 The levels of unconstrained ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow sensitivities of cash and debt may diﬀer
from zero if there are additional costs or beneﬁts of cash and debt. However, these sensitivities
should be independent of the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities.
183 Empirical Tests
3.1 Sample Selection Criteria
To test our model’s predictions we use a sample of manufacturing ﬁrms (SICs 200—399) taken from
COMPUSTAT’s P/S/T, Full Coverage, and Research annual tapes over the 1971—2001 period. We
require ﬁrms to provide valid information on their total assets, sales, debt, market capitalization,
cash holdings, operating income, depreciation, tax payments, interest payments, and dividend pay-
ments. We deﬂate all series to 1971 dollars.
Our data selection criteria and variable construction approach follows that of Almeida et al.
(2004), who study the impact of ﬁnancing constraints on the management of internal funds, and
that of Frank and Goyal (2003), who look at external ﬁnancing decisions. Similarly to Frank and
Goyal we look at changes in debt and cash positions using data from ﬁrms’ “ﬂow of funds state-
ments” (available from 1971 onwards).10 As in Almeida et al., we discard from the raw data those
ﬁrm-years for which the market capitalization is less than $10 million as well as ﬁrm-years display-
ing asset or sales growth exceeding 100%. The ﬁrst screen eliminates from the sample those ﬁrms
with severely limited access to the public markets – our theory about the internal—external funding
interplay implies that the ﬁrm does have active (albeit potentially constrained) access to funds from
the ﬁnancial markets. The second screen eliminates those ﬁrm-years registering large jumps in their
business fundamentals (typically indicative of major corporate events).
In identifying in the data those ﬁrms with active cash and debt policies, we further require that
ﬁrms have at least $0.5 million in cash in their balance sheets, and that they register positive debt
in at least one year of the sample period. For our purposes, it is important that we minimize the
sampling of distressed ﬁrms. Cash and debt policies of distressed ﬁrms may be primarily driven by
their desire to avoid bankruptcy costs (see Smith and Stulz (1985) and Acharya, Huang, Subrah-
manyam, and Sundaram (2000)). In contrast, the underlying rationale for cash and debt policies
that we emphasize in our theory is largely unrelated to ﬁnancial distress. Accordingly, we require
that ﬁrm annual sales exceed $1 million and we eliminate ﬁrm-years for which debt exceeds total
assets (near-bankruptcy ﬁrms).11
Finally, we also eliminate those ﬁrms whose net debt issuance or repurchase exceed the value
of their total assets for the year (see Lemmon and Zender (2004)), and those whose market-to-
book asset ratio (or Q) is either negative or greater than 10 (see Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)
and Almeida and Campello (2004)). Also following Gilchrist and Himmelberg and Almeida and
10The use of data from the ﬂow of funds statements ensures that the changes in cash and debt ﬁgures that we
observe are associated with actual ﬂows of resources as opposed to simple accounting restatements.
11We will later experiment with restricting the sample according to direct measures of ﬁnancial distress, such as
Altman’s Z-score and the interest coverage ratio.
19Campello, we try to minimize the impact of sample attrition on the stability of the data process by
requiring that ﬁrms provide over ﬁv ey e a r so fv a l i di n f o r m a t i o no nt h e i rd e b ta n dc a s hp o l i c i e s .I n
fact, requiring ﬁrms to appear for a minimum of periods in the sample serves an important objective:
it allows us to compute a robust empirical counterpart of the notion of ﬁrms’ “hedging needs” (more
on this shortly). Our ﬁnal sample consists of 20,146 ﬁrm-year observations. Descriptive statistics
for the key empirical variables we construct using this sample are provided below.
3.2 Methodology
To test our theory, we need to specify an empirical model that allows us to see how cash ﬂow inno-
vations are absorbed by cash savings and debt issuance policies. We also need to identify in the data
both ﬁnancially constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. Finally, we need an empirical counterpart for
the notion hedging needs. We tackle each one of these issues in turn.
3.2.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
We examine the simultaneous, within-ﬁrm responses of cash and debt policies to cash ﬂow inno-
vations across sets of constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms through a system of equations. The
equations in the system are parsimoniously speciﬁed. In addition to ﬁrm size and variables that are
needed to identify the system, the ﬁnancial policy equations only include proxies that we believe
are related to the primitives of our theory: cash ﬂows and investment opportunities. Furthermore,
rather than regarding marginal cash savings and debt issuance/repurchase decisions as orthogo-
nal to each other, we fully endogenize debt and cash policies in our system of equations. In this
w a y ,t h ei m p a c to fc a s hﬂow on cash savings accounts for marginal, contemporaneous net debt
issuance/repurchase decisions. And the same goes for the impact of cash ﬂows on marginal debt
decisions – they, too, endogenize cash policies.12
Deﬁne ∆Debt as the ratio of the net long-term debt issuances (COMPUSTAT’s item #111 — item
#114) to total book value of assets (item #6), and ∆CashHold as changes in the holdings of cash
and other liquid securities (item #234) divided by total assets. CashFlow is an empirical measure
that is designed to proxy for “excess cash ﬂow” in our theory. Recall, we want to study a ﬁrm’s use
12To see how spurious inferences could be drawn if cash and debt policies are not corrected for endogeneity,
consider the case of a ﬁrm facing increased demand for investment (say, because it learns about the existence of
positive NPV projects in its opportunity set). Depending on the underlying correlation between the ﬁrm’s cash
ﬂows and investment opportunities (hedging needs), we could have the case in which the ﬁrm both issues debt and
observes a high cash ﬂow. Clearly, the mechanical (“pure accounting”) eﬀect of a debt issuance is to increase the
ﬁrm’s cash stocks, as the proceeds from security issuances are parked in the ﬁrm’s cash accounts until capital is
ultimately purchased. Under this scenario, it is easy to see that a regression of changes in cash reserves on cash ﬂows
alone will lead to the spurious conclusion that the ﬁrm is “saving cash out of cash ﬂows.” Likewise, when making
inferences about the sensitivity of debt changes to cash ﬂows, one would like to account for changes in the ﬁrm’s cash
stocks: we cannot determine if a ﬁrm reduces debt (as opposed to saving cash) in response to cash ﬂow shocks unless
we net out the eﬀect of changes in cash balances from the association between debt and cash ﬂows.
20of “uncommitted” cash inﬂows towards its cash and debt balances. In empirically measuring these
inﬂows, we start from the ﬁrm’s gross operating income (COMPUSTAT’s item #13) and from it
subtract amounts committed to capital reinvestment (proxied by asset depreciation, or item #14),
to the payment of taxes (item #16), to the payment of debtholders (interest expense, item #15),
and to payments to equity holders (dividends, items #19 and #21). We then scale the remainder
by the book value of assets.13 Our basic proxy for investment opportunities, Q, is computed as
the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24 × item
#25) − item #60 − item #74) / (item #6). Throughout the analysis we gather estimates from
the following 3SLS system:
∆Debti,t = α0 + α1CashFlowi,t + α2Qi,t + α3Sizei,t (13)








∆CashHoldi,t = β0 + β1CashFlowi,t + β2Qi,t + β3Sizei,t (14)








where Size is the natural log of sales (item #12), and ﬁrm and year absorb ﬁrm- and time-speciﬁc
eﬀects, respectively.14
Our theory’s central predictions concern the responses of debt issuance and cash savings to cash
ﬂows, captured by α1 and β1 in Eqs. (13) and (14), respectively. Lagged levels (i.e., stocks) of the
dependent variables in those equations are entered in order to identify the system.15 Accordingly,
Debt in Eq. (13) is deﬁned as COMPUSTAT’s item #9 over item #6, and CashHold in (14) is item
13Implicitly, we take depreciation (item #14) as a minimum amount of investment needed to avoid asset depletion.
In this vein, we see it as a proxy for “nondiscretionary”investment (observed investment spending is, of course, a more
discretionary measure of investment). Dividends can be seen as discretionary; however, in practice ﬁr m sd on o ts e e m
to ﬁne-tune their dividend policy according to their cash ﬂow process (dividends are relatively sticky, whereas cash
ﬂows are not). We also experimented with the idea of computing CashFlow without the inclusion of dividends and
our ﬁndings were qualitatively similar. The same happens if, following a number of studies in the capital structure
literature, we compute CashFlow as net income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT’s item #18).
14An alternative approach to the question of how cash and debt balances respond to cash ﬂow innovations across
constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms is to run the following set of (stacked) OLS regressions across the two constraint
ﬁrm-types:


















When we experiment with this SUR-like OLS system we also get results that fully agree with our theory. As we
discuss above, however, using an estimator that, for each sampled ﬁrm, simultaneously endogenizes the impact of
debt issuance activity on cash policies and vice-versa – in the way the 3SLS does – provides for the appropriate
empirical testing framework for our theory.
15Our results also hold when we use twiced lagged levels of debt and cash and when we use the projections of those
ﬁrm proxies onto indicators for industry-years.
21#1 over item #6. We explicitly control for possible biases stemming from unobserved individual
heterogeneity and time idiosyncrasies by expunging ﬁrm- and time-ﬁxed eﬀects from our slope
coeﬃcient estimates. In ﬁtting the data, we allow residuals to be correlated across our debt and cash
models; that is, reported t-statistics are deﬂated to account for cross-equation residual correlation.
3.2.2 Financial Constraints Criteria
Testing the implications of our model requires separating ﬁrms according to a priori measures of
the ﬁnancing frictions that they face. There are a number of plausible approaches to sorting ﬁrms
into ﬁnancially constrained and unconstrained categories, and we do not have strong priors about
which approach is best. Following Almeida et al. (2004), we use a number of alternative schemes
to partition our sample:
• Scheme #1: In every year over the 1971 to 2001 period, we rank ﬁrms based on their payout
ratio and assign to the ﬁnancially constrained (unconstrained) group those ﬁrms that are in
the bottom (top) three deciles of the annual payout distribution. We compute the payout
ratio as the ratio of total distributions (dividends and repurchases) to operating income. The
intuition that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly lower payout ratios follows from
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), among many others, in the ﬁnancial constraints lit-
erature. In the capital structure literature, Fama and French (2002) use payout ratios as a
measure of the diﬃculties ﬁrms may face in assessing the ﬁnancial markets.
• Scheme #2: We rank ﬁrms based on their asset size over the 1971 to 2001 period and assign
to the ﬁnancially constrained (unconstrained) group those ﬁrms that are in the bottom (top)
three deciles of the size distribution. The rankings are again performed on an annual basis.
This approach resembles that of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Erickson and Whited
(2000), who also distinguish between groups of ﬁnancially constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms
on the basis of size. Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003) also associate ﬁrm
size with the degree of external ﬁnancing frictions. The argument for size as a good observable
measure of ﬁnancial constraints is that small ﬁrms are typically young, less well known, and
thus more vulnerable to capital-market imperfections.
• Scheme #3: We retrieve data on ﬁrms’ bond ratings and categorize as being ﬁnancially con-
strained those ﬁrms that never had their public debt rated during our sample period. Given
that unconstrained ﬁrms may choose not to use debt ﬁnancing and hence may not have a debt
rating, we only assign to the constrained subsample those ﬁrm-years that both lack a rating
and report positive debt (see Faulkender and Petersen (2004)).16 Financially unconstrained
16Firms with no bond rating and no debt are considered unconstrained, but our results are not aﬀected if we treat
22ﬁrms are those whose bonds have been rated during the sample period. Related approaches
for characterizing ﬁnancial constraints are used by Whited (1992), Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), and Lemmon and Zender (2004). The advantage of this measure over the former two
is that it gauges the market’s assessment of a ﬁrm’s credit quality. The same rationale applies
to the next measure.
• Scheme #4: We retrieve data on ﬁrms’ commercial paper ratings and categorize as being
ﬁnancially constrained those ﬁrms that never display any ratings during our sample period.
Observations from these ﬁrms are only assigned to the constrained subsample in the years
a positive debt is reported. Firms whose commercial papers receive ratings during our sam-
ple period are considered unconstrained. This approach follows from the work of Calomiris,
Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995) on the characteristics of commercial paper issuers.
Table 1 reports the number of ﬁrm-years under each of the eight ﬁnancial constraint categories
used in our analysis. According to the payout scheme, for example, there are 6,153 ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrm-years and 6,231 ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm-years. The table also shows the
extent to which the four classiﬁcation schemes are related. For example, out of the 6,153 ﬁrm-years
classiﬁed as constrained according to the payout scheme, 2,680 are also constrained according to
the size scheme, while a smaller number, 1,078 ﬁrm-years, are classiﬁed as unconstrained. The
remaining ﬁrm-years represent payout-constrained ﬁrms that are neither constrained nor uncon-
strained according to size. In general, there is a positive correlation among the four measures of
ﬁnancial constraints. For example, most small (large) ﬁrms lack (have) bond ratings. Also, most
small (large) ﬁrms have low (high) payout policies. However, the table also makes it clear that these
cross-group correlations are far from perfect.
− insert Table 1 here −
3.2.3 Measuring Hedging Needs
To identify ﬁrms that have a high need for hedging, we examine the relationship between ﬁrms’
free operating cash ﬂows and a proxy for investment opportunities that is both exogenous to their
internal cash ﬂow process and extraneous to our baseline empirical model (Eqs. (13) and (14)).
Note that we cannot look directly at the correlation between a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and investment
spending, since the two are endogenously related when ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained. The same
is true for the correlation between a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and Q if the anticipation of a ﬁrm’s ability
these ﬁrms as neither constrained nor unconstrained. We use the same criterion for ﬁrms with no commercial paper
rating and no debt in scheme #4. In unreported robustness checks, we have restricted the sample to the period
where ﬁrms’ bond ratings are observed every year (from 1986 to 2001), allowing ﬁrms to migrate across constraint
categories. Our conclusions are insensitive to these changes in sampling window and ﬁrm assignment criteria.
23to pursue proﬁtable investment opportunities is already capitalized in its stock price. We consider
three alternative measures of investment opportunities that ﬁt the above requirements, all of which
are based on industry-level proxies.
First, following the literature that links expenditures in product research and development to
investment opportunities (see, e.g., Graham (2000) and Fama and French (2002)), we look at the
correlation between a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow from current operations (CashFlow)a n di t sindustry-level me-
dian of R&D expenditures to assess whether a ﬁrm’s availability of internal funds is correlated with
the ﬁrm’s demand for investment funds.17 We compute this correlation, ﬁrm by ﬁrm, identifying the
ﬁrm’s industry using its three-digit SIC code. We then partition our sample into ﬁrms displaying low
and high correlation between investment demand and supply of internal funds. To be precise, recall
that our theory has particularly clear implications for cash and debt policies of constrained ﬁrms at
the high and low ends of the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities. Accord-
ingly, we assign to the group of “low hedging needs” those ﬁrms for which the empirical correlation
between cash ﬂow and industry R&D is above 0.2, and to the group of “high hedging needs” those
ﬁrms for which this correlation is below —0.2. We emphasize that although these cut-oﬀs may seem
arbitrary, they ensure that ﬁrms in either group have correlation coeﬃcient estimates that are statis-
tically reliable.18 Moreover, our results are robust to changes in these cut-oﬀs (e.g., ±0.1 or ±0.3).
The second measure of investment opportunities we consider is related to observed product-
market demand. Speciﬁcally, for each ﬁrm-year in the sample we compute the median three-year-
ahead sales growth rate in the ﬁrm’s three-digit SIC and then compute the correlation between
the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow and this measure of industry sales growth. The premise of this approach is
that ﬁrms’ perceived investment opportunities (and demand for investment funds) will be related
to estimates of future sales growth in their industries and that those estimates, on average, coincide
with the data. To be consistent with the ﬁrst characterization of hedging needs, we also set cut-oﬀs
for high and low hedging needs at correlation coeﬃcients of 0.2 and —0.2, respectively.
The third measure we use to capture investment opportunities is somewhat closer to that con-
tained in our empirical model; we look at Q. Crucially, rather than relying on a ﬁrm’s industry
level of Q, which could be highly related to the ﬁrm’s Q itself (and recall, this is included in the
speciﬁcation), we look at changes in the ﬁrm’s industry median Q. By looking at changes in industry
Q we remove the ﬁxed, level component of Q and yet retain a reasonably good proxy for innova-
17R&D expenditures are measured as COMPUSTAT item #46 divided by item #6. Recall, all of the ﬁrms in our
sample come from the manufacturing sector. Industries in this sector of the economy are relatively homogeneous in
a number of dimensions. We think of temporal, cross-industry diﬀerences in R&D expenditures as a phenomenon
that is correlated with the emergence of diﬀerential growth opportunities across industries (caused, for example, by
changes in consumer preferences and technological innovation).
18This point is important in that our sample, although large in the cross-section dimension, is limited in the
time series dimension (this is the dimension used to compute the correlation between ﬁrm-level cash ﬂows and
industry-level investment opportunities).
24tions in investment opportunities that diﬀerent ﬁrms face. Once again we use the ±0.2 cut-oﬀsf o r
correlation coeﬃcients between ﬁrm cash ﬂow and this measure of investment opportunities when
assigning ﬁrms to low and high hedging needs groups.
3.3 Sample Characteristics
To test our theory, we must identify groups of ﬁrms facing diﬀerential levels of ﬁnancial constraints
and hedging needs. To our knowledge, no previous study has diﬀerentiated ﬁrms along both of these
dimensions. Hence, it is important that we highlight and discuss basic diﬀerences in ﬁrm character-
istics across constrained/unconstrained subsamples and low/high hedging needs subsamples. Pre-
senting these descriptive statistics is interesting in its own right, but it also helps us assess the merits
of candidate alternative explanations for our central (multivariate-based) empirical ﬁndings.19
To recap, our analysis suggests four ﬁrm-types based on the intersection of the degree of ﬁnancial
constraints and the degree of hedging needs. And we consider four measures of ﬁnancial constraints
and three measures of hedging needs. Thus, for every empirical variable we examine, our categoriza-
tion scheme yields 48 sets of statistics (4 × 4 × 3). In the interest of completeness and robustness, we
summarize each of the central empirical proxies used in our analysis across all possible categoriza-
tions. This summary is provided in Table 2, which reports mean, median, and number of observa-
tions for beginning-of-period long-term debt to asset ratio (Debt), beginning-of-period cash to asset
ratio (CashHold), net cash ﬂow scaled by assets (CashFlow), the market-to-book asset ratio (Q),
and the net diﬀerence between debt issuance and repurchase scaled by assets (∆Debt). The table
also shows a standard measure of ﬁnancial distress (Z-Score) in order to aid some of our discussion.20
Because our sampling approach and variable construction methods follow the existing literature,
it is not surprising that the numbers we report in Table 2 resemble those found in related studies
(see, e.g., Frank and Goyal (2003) and Almeida et al. (2004)). In particular, as in Frank and Goyal,
average leverage ratios ﬂuctuate around 0.19 and average Q’s hover around 1.6. The ﬁgures for net
debt issues and cash ﬂows are also comparable across the two papers; note, however, that Frank and
Goyal scale debt issuances by net (as opposed to total) assets. More important for our purposes,
note that there seems to be only limited evidence that any of these proxies vary systematically
across the four ﬁrm-types we study. So, for example, constrained ﬁrms seem to carry more debt
according to some characterizations (e.g., based on payout policy), but less according to others
19Sample summary statistics can only go so far in providing evidence of any theory on the marginal allocation
of funds and ﬁnancing decisions. We cannot, for example, use summary statistics on cash stocks to draw inferences
about the dynamics of hedging needs and cash savings – at any point in time, a ﬁrm’s observed cash stocks will
reﬂect (i.e., confound) ex ante policies and ex post outcomes. Our multivariate analysis, in contrast, is designed to
shed light on ﬁrms’ hedging needs and marginal cash savings decisions following cash ﬂow innovations.
20Here we use Altman’s “unleveraged” Z-Score measure (as also used by Frank and Goyal (2003)), computed as
3.3×(item #170/item #6) + (item #12/item #6) + 1.4×(item #36/item #6) + 1.2×((item #4—item #5)/item #6).
25(e.g., size); with no signiﬁcant variation between ﬁrms with high and low hedging needs within the
same constraint type. Consistent with intuition, some characterizations suggest that constrained
ﬁrms are more proﬁtable and/or have higher growth opportunities (see statistics for low dividend
paying ﬁrms). However, notice that (1) these diﬀerences are not always robust within and across the
panels of Table 2, (2) diﬀerences are economically insigniﬁcant (e.g., Q’s are overall economically
similar across ﬁrm-types), and (3) there are no systematic diﬀerences between constrained ﬁrms
with high and low hedging needs (even though some slight subsample patterns appear to arise, we
have veriﬁed that they are generally statistically insigniﬁcant). In all, diﬀerences in investment
opportunities and/or cash ﬂows are unlikely to provide alternative explanations for why joint cash
and debt policies should vary across our four categories of ﬁrms.
− insert Table 2 here −
Statistics for cash holdings are similar to those in Almeida et al., whose study focuses on this
particular variable. As in their paper, we also ﬁnd that constrained ﬁrms hold far more cash on
average than unconstrained ﬁrms. However, there is little systematic variation across ﬁrms with
diﬀerent hedging needs – even though low hedging needs ﬁrm appear to carry more cash on aver-
age, diﬀerences across ﬁrm-types are most of the time statistically insigniﬁcant. Finally, we consider
diﬀerences in ﬁnancial distress measures across ﬁrms in our sample using Altman’s Z-Score. One
could argue that ﬁnancial distress alone may drive diﬀerences in the way ﬁrms make their cash and
debt choices. While we do not dispute this hypothesis, it poses a challenge to our story only if we
ﬁnd that underlying patterns in the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress are systematically diﬀerent across
our four ﬁr m - t y p e s . W eh a v en op r i o r sa st ow h yﬁnancial distress will inﬂuence our assignment
of ﬁrms in a systematic way, but we let the data tell us if such a sample-selection bias exists. The
second to last column in each of the panels A though C in Table 2 reveals no systematic relation
between ﬁnancial constraints, hedging needs, and ﬁnancial distress. This is a reassuring ﬁnding
that is consistent with unreported robustness checks in which we show that the exclusion of ﬁrms
with high risk of ﬁnancial distress (Z-scores below 1.81 and interest coverage ratios below 1) from
our 3SLS estimations does not aﬀect our conclusions.21
One aspect of our characterization of the data that is new to the literature regards the propen-
sity of ﬁrms to issue or repay debt given the ﬁnancial constraints and investment opportunities that
they face. The mean and medians reported in the last column in each of the panels of Table 2
suggest that unconstrained ﬁrms, on net terms, seem to issue more debt than constrained ﬁrms.
21Our conclusions are also unaﬀected when we remove from the sample those ﬁrms with consecutive operating
losses (two or more consecutive years of negative proﬁts) and those ﬁrms high earnings volatility (over three standard
deviations from their three-digit SIC industry means). Noteworthy, ﬁrms in these categories are roughly equally
distributed among the high and low hedging needs categories.
26However, these statistics reveal little about the frequency with which these ﬁrms approach capital
markets to raise additional debt or repay outstanding debt. In order to shed light on the frequency
with which our sample ﬁrms tap the market for debt securities, for each one of our four ﬁrm-types,
we computed the number of ﬁrm-years for which either no issuance or repurchase activity is regis-
tered, and also the number of ﬁrm-years in which debt issues surpass repurchases, and vice-versa.
In the interest of brevity we only report and discuss these results in the text (the tables are readily
available upon request).
We ﬁnd that the frequency with which constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms act on their own
debt accounts is not very diﬀerent. The percentage of constrained ﬁrm-years that neither issue nor
repurchase debt is roughly in the 3—6% range (depend on the constraint criteria used), while the
percentage of unconstrained ﬁrms that also do nothing to their debt accounts is in a similar 3—6%
range. This suggests that a large proportion of ﬁrms in each one of our four ﬁrm groups is active in
the debt markets. In addition, constrained ﬁrms tend to make more trips to debt markets in order
to repurchase debt (net repurchase activities are registered by some 50 to 60% of the constrained
ﬁrm-years), while unconstrained ﬁrms display the opposite pattern (net issuance activities in the
47—53% range). In other words, while rejecting the notion that constrained ﬁrms are largely inac-
tive in the debt markets, our frequency tests reveal that constrained ﬁr m si s s u ed e b ts o m e w h a tl e s s
frequently than unconstrained ﬁrms and manage their debt accounts with more frequent repurchase
initiatives. Finally, we observe that the overall frequency of debt issuances and repurchases varies
little across the dimension of hedging needs.
3.4 Debt and Cash Policies across Constrained and Unconstrained Firms
Our testing approach requires us to compare the cash ﬂow sensitivities of cash and debt estimated
from Eqs. (13) and (14) across groups of ﬁrms, sorted both on measures of constraints and of hedging
needs. Before we do that, we present some preliminary regressions in which we consider only the
diﬀerences between constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms; i.e., without sorting on hedging needs.
The purpose of this is two-fold. First, it is interesting to see the average pattern of cash ﬂow sen-
sitivities for unconstrained ﬁrms: this average pattern provides evidence on the net costs of cash
and debt in the absence of constraints and thus provides a benchmark against which to evaluate
the results obtained for constrained ﬁrms. Second, these regressions allow for direct comparisons
with previous papers in the literature on marginal ﬁnancing decisions. While those papers do not
consider the hedging dimension we are exploring, it is important that we are able to replicate their
primary ﬁndings in our data.
Table 3 presents the results obtained from the estimation of our baseline regression system
(Eqs. (13) and (14)) within each sample partition described in Section 3.2.2. A total of 16 es-
27timated results are reported in the table (2 equations × 4 constraint criteria × 2 ﬁrm-types per
constraint criterion). Results from the debt regressions (in Panel A) make it clear that constrained
ﬁrms have no systematic tendency to change their debt positions following a cash ﬂow innovation.
This is in sharp contrast to the policies of ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms. For each new dollar of
excess cash ﬂow, an unconstrained ﬁrm will reduce the amount of debt it issues by approximately 25
to 33 cents – the cash ﬂow sensitivities of debt for unconstrained ﬁrms are all signiﬁcant at better
than the 1% test level. This negative relationship between cash ﬂows and debt issues is consistent
with the ﬁndings of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), who report that debt issues are positively
related to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing deﬁcit for the types of ﬁrms that we classify as unconstrained.22 In
turn, results from the cash regressions (Panel B) conform to those of Almeida et al. (2004). Un-
der each constraint criterion, the set of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms display a signiﬁcantly positive
relationship between excess cash ﬂows and changes in cash holdings – their cash ﬂow sensitivities
of cash are all signiﬁcant at better than the 1% test level. Unconstrained ﬁrms, in contrast, do not
display any systematic propensity to save cash out of excess cash ﬂows.
− insert Table 3 here −
As discussed in Section 2.4, our theory makes clearer predictions about the relationship between
cash ﬂow sensitivities and hedging needs than about the average level of those sensitivities across
ﬁnancial constraints alone. This is partly because the theory does not pin down the levels of the
sensitivities for unconstrained ﬁrms, and partly because the average level of the sensitivities for
constrained ﬁrms depends on the distribution of hedging needs within these ﬁrms. Nonetheless, one
can rationalize the “overall, average” results from Table 3 as follows. Unconstrained ﬁrms seem to
display a preference towards using cash ﬂows to reduce debt instead of holding cash in their balance
sheets. This ﬁnding indicates that holding cash is relatively costly for these ﬁrms, perhaps because
cash has low yield and/or it can be diverted by management (our examination need not take a
stand of these exact costs). In contrast, constrained ﬁrms choose to retain cash in spite of the fact
that cash retention may be relatively costly. This ﬁnding alone suggests that cash has a relevant
e c o n o m i cr o l et op l a yw h e nﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained. Finally, the additional ﬁnding that
debt is not systematically related to cash ﬂows for constrained ﬁrms suggests that these ﬁrms on
average prefer positive cash over negative debt.
To show that cash and debt policies of constrained ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by our theoretical pre-
dictions, we need to ﬁnd evidence that these policies are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by hedging needs.
We examine this issue in turn.
22Note that Shyam-Sunder and Myers do not consider contrasts between constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms.
However, their sample selection scheme ensures that only large ﬁrms with rated debt enter the sample, hence their
results can be compared with our debt regressions for unconstrained ﬁrms.
283.5 Debt and Cash Policies: Hedging Needs
The tests of this section consist of performing estimations of our 3SLS system across (double) par-
titions of constrained/unconstrained ﬁrms and ﬁrms with low/high hedging needs. Table 4 reports
the results from those system estimations, separately for constrained ﬁrms (Panel A) and uncon-
strained ﬁrms (Panel B). The table features our ﬁrst proxy for investment opportunities – that is,
industry R&D expenditures – in the computation of the correlation between a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and
the investment opportunities it faces. Table 5 is similarly compiled, but the results there employ
our second measure of growth opportunities, industry sales growth. Finally, Table 6 presents the
same sorts of regression outputs, but it employs changes in industry Q as the proxy for investment
opportunities. For ease of exposition, we only present estimates of the cash ﬂow sensitivities of cash
and debt in the 3SLS system; that is, α1 and β1, respectively.
− insert Table 4 here −
− insert Table 5 here −
− insert Table 6 here −
Results in Tables 4 through 6 are all very similar. As in previous estimations, unconstrained
ﬁrms display a strong, negative cash ﬂow sensitivity of debt – they use their free cash ﬂow to cut
down debt – and their cash policies are completely insensitive to cash ﬂow innovations. Impor-
tantly, these patterns are largely unrelated to measures of hedging needs. To be precise, the cash
ﬂow sensitivities of cash are insigniﬁcant for the vast majority of unconstrained ﬁrm subsamples
(both those with low and those with high hedging needs). And while cash ﬂow sensitivities of debt
are sometimes more negative for ﬁrms with low hedging needs, the reverse pattern occurs with
almost the same frequency. Overall, the estimates from regressions for unconstrained ﬁrms suggest
that there is no systematic relation between hedging needs and either of the cash ﬂow sensitivities.
The inferences are strikingly diﬀerent for constrained ﬁrms. The results show that constrained
ﬁrms with high hedging needs display the least negative cash ﬂow sensitivities of debt – in fact,
their net borrowing positions increase with cash ﬂows – and they are also the ones doing the most
cash savings. In contrast, constrained ﬁrms with low hedging needs display a tendency to reduce
their outstanding debt when they have cash ﬂow surpluses, a pattern that is similar (but weaker in
magnitude) to that observed for unconstrained ﬁrms. In a handful of speciﬁcations (see Table 6),
constrained ﬁrms with low hedging needs seem to have a propensity to save cash. But this pattern
is far from robust. In Tables 4 and 5, for example, the cash ﬂow sensitivities of cash are never
signiﬁcant for constrained ﬁrms with low hedging needs.
We also report the p-values of the diﬀerences in cash ﬂow sensitivities of cash and debt within
constrained and unconstrained subsamples (i.e., across hedging needs subsamples). One central
29pattern is clear, and independent of the speciﬁc correlation measure: constrained ﬁrms with high
hedging needs have higher cash ﬂow sensitivities of cash, and less negative cash ﬂow sensitivities of
debt than constrained ﬁrms with low hedging needs.
In all, the results from Tables 4 through 6 are fully consistent with the predictions of our model.
Constrained ﬁrms do have a much stronger propensity to save cash out of cash ﬂows, and a much
weaker propensity to reduce debt when their hedging needs are high.23 This pattern suggests that
future investment needs, jointly with expectations about the availability of internal funds, are key
determinants of these ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial policies. The fact that unconstrained ﬁrms do not display such
patterns gives additional evidence that these patterns are indeed produced by the joint, dynamic
optimization of ﬁnancing and investment that characterizes constrained ﬁrms’ policies.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We propose and test a theory of cash—debt substitutability in the presence of ﬁnancing constraints.
Our results show that cash cannot be treated as negative debt for constrained ﬁrms, particularly
for those with high hedging needs. These ﬁrms prefer to allocate excess cash ﬂows into cash hold-
ings. In contrast, constrained ﬁrms with low hedging needs prefer to use excess cash ﬂows towards
reducing outstanding debt, thereby “saving” future borrowing capacity.
Our results suggest that there is an important hedging dimension to standard ﬁnancial policies
such as cash and debt management in the presence of ﬁnancing frictions. While the link between
hedging and ﬁnancing constraints was previously identiﬁed by Froot et al. (1993), the implications
of this link for cash and debt policies had hitherto not been studied. In looking at cash and debt
balances as hedging devices, we ﬁnd evidence of activities by real-world ﬁrms that are fully con-
sistent with the theoretical link between hedging and ﬁnancing constraints. Such a match between
theory and evidence has often eluded those researchers who focus on the use of derivatives as hedg-
ing tools. We also identify an empirical counterpart for the notion of hedging demand. Based on
the correlation between ﬁrm-level cash ﬂows and industry-level investment opportunities, our study
suggests various easy-to-implement measures of “hedging needs.”
As we discuss in the Introduction, there are two possible characterizations of the view of “cash
as negative debt.” First, ﬁrms could simply be indiﬀerent between having more cash or less debt in
their balance sheets. Second, cash can be seen as the negative of debt when ﬁrms use cash to reduce
debt. Our theory suggests that under the ﬁrst characterization, cash can only be negative debt if
ﬁrms are ﬁnancially unconstrained and no other frictions cause ﬁrms to prefer negative debt over
positive cash, and vice-versa. The existence of ﬁnancial constraints, in particular, eliminates the
23Notice that the positive cash ﬂow sensitivities of debt for ﬁrms with high hedging needs are consistent with the
predictions of the model augmented by date 0 investment (cf. Section 2.3.2 and Appendix B).
30indiﬀerence between cash and (negative) debt because these two components of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
s t r u c t u r eh a v ed i ﬀerent implications for ﬁrms’ feasible investment spending. Concerning the sec-
ond characterization, our paper gives a more involved answer. Speciﬁcally, cash can be viewed as
negative debt even for constrained ﬁrms if their hedging needs are low: these ﬁrms should display
a preference towards using cash to reduce debt. In contrast, cash will not be used to reduce debt
by constrained ﬁrms with high hedging needs. For these ﬁrms, the value of cash inside the ﬁrm is
higher than when it is used to reduce debt.
Our analysis focused mostly on the substitution eﬀect between cash and debt among ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms. However, our ﬁnding that ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms, too, display a system-
atic preference for using excess cash ﬂows to reduce debt suggests that other considerations are at
play in the data. These considerations could include, for example, issues such as the yield on cash
relative to the ﬁrm’s eﬀective borrowing cost and the diversion of free cash ﬂows by management.
Future research should try to identify the eﬀects of tax parameters, agency problems, and liquidity
premiums, among others, on the use of ﬁnancial policy to eﬀect corporate hedging in general, and
on the substitutability between cash and debt in particular.
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AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fL e m m a1












It is our maintained assumption that [1−τg
0(I)] is greater than zero. From Eq. (7), if ∆ >   ∆,t h e nτcH >τc L >d
N
2
and [τc2 − d
N
2 ]
+ = τc2 − D0 + ∆. It follows that in this case, IH(∆) and IL(∆) are independent of ∆.
When ∆ <   ∆, τcH ≥ d
N
2 >τ c L.H e n c e ,[τcH − d
N
2 ]
+ = τcH − d2 +
∆
p∗ and [τcL − d
N
2 ]
+ =0 . It follows that in
this case, IH(∆) is strictly increasing in ∆ and IL(∆) is strictly decreasing in ∆.
Finally, note that for a given state s, I
∗
s(∆) is either equal to I
FB, which is independent of ∆,o re q u a lt oIs(∆).
The lemma now follows from the properties of Is(∆) derived above. ♦
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
We start the characterization of the optimal ﬁnancial policy with the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The ﬁrm is ﬁnancially unconstrained if and only if it is unconstrained in state L when ∆ = ∆min.O t h e r -
wise, it is ﬁnancially constrained in the sense that there does not exist a ∆ that allows the ﬁrm to invest at ﬁrst-best
levels in both states.
Proof: From Eq. (2), note that for a given ∆,i ft h eﬁrm is unconstrained in state L,t h e n
I








Since cH >c L, this inequality must also hold with cL replaced by cH,a n di nt u r n ,t h eﬁrm must be unconstrained in
state H as well. Furthermore, from Lemma 1, I
∗
L(∆) is weakly decreasing in ∆. Hence, if the ﬁrm is unconstrained
in state L at ∆ = ∆min, then the ﬁrm is always ﬁnancially unconstrained. ♦
This lemma is a straightforward implication of the fact that in terms of ﬁnancing capacity the only (ex post)
diﬀerence between state L and state H is that cash ﬂows from existing assets are higher in state H. Consequently,
the ﬁnancing capacity in state H is always higher than in state L, for all possible ∆, which means that if the ﬁrm is
ﬁnancially unconstrained in state L,i tm u s ta l s ob eﬁnancially unconstrained in state H. Because state-L ﬁnancing
capacity is decreasing in ∆ (see Lemma 1), a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the ﬁrm to be unconstrained is
that the ﬁrm invests at the ﬁrst-best level when ﬁnancing capacity in state L is at its maximum.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1. Consider ﬁrst a ﬁrm that is ﬁnancially unconstrained. From Lemma 2,




From Lemma 2, I
∗




L(∆min) and the ﬁrm may be
rendered constrained if it becomes constrained in state L.D e n o t e  ∆ as the minimum of ∆max and the maximum
value of ∆ for which I
∗
L(∆)=I
FB. It follows that for ∆ ∈ [∆min,   ∆],t h eﬁrm is unconstrained and hence indiﬀerent
in picking any policy ∆.F o r∆ >   ∆,t h eﬁrm is rendered constrained in state L which can only reduce ﬁrm value.
Consider now a ﬁrm that is ﬁnancially constrained for all ∆. In this case, the ﬁrm solves the maximization problem
in (9) and I
∗
s(∆)=Is(∆), the constrained investment levels given by (2). Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of “small” increases
in ∆,s u c ht h a tτcL <d
N
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(p+(1−p)q) < 1, we obtain that for φ ≤ 0.5, the left hand side of the ﬁrst-order condition is always negative,
whereby ∆
∗ = ∆min.A t φ =1 ,i ti sa l w a y sp o s i t i v ew h e r e b y∆
∗ =m i n (   ∆,∆max). This last step follows from the
fact that once the debt repayment is “large” (equal to   ∆), the debt becomes riskless and a further increase in debt
repayment does not aﬀect the objective function. To see this, note that Eqs. (2) and (7) for τcL >d
N
2 imply that
IH = c0 + τg(IH)+τcH − D0 (17)
IL = c0 + τg(IL)+τcL − D0. (18)
Next, we show that whenever ∆
∗ is interior, it is increasing in φ. Then, the existence of unique φ and φ follows
by the intermediate-value theorem.









































For future reference, deﬁne   p ≡
p(1−q)
(p+(1−p)q).S i n c e  p multiplies the marginal productivity of investment at state





















This completes the proof that
d∆
dφ > 0.♦
In addition, we can show that ∆








































The ﬁrst term in brackets arises from the fact that   p is increasing in p. The second term arises from the fact that
for a given ∆
∗, IH is decreasing in p
∗ (and thus in both p and q). Thus, a high p increases the incentives to invest in











































which cannot generally be signed. The ﬁrst term in the brackets is negative because   p decreases in q. However,
the second term is positive because IH is decreasing in p
∗.








∂c0 > 0 and
∂∆
∂c0 =0 .
For φ ≥ φ, ∆
∗ =m i n (  ∆,∆max).S i n c e  ∆ is independent of c0 and ∆max =m i n ( c0,D 0) is weakly increasing in c0,
we obtain that for
∂∆
∂c0 > 0. When the relevant parameter range is ∆
∗ = c0, then we also obtain that
∂c1
∂c0 =0 . ♦
BD a t e 0 I n v e s t m e n t s
We modify the basic model of Section 2.2 by assuming that instead of the exogenously given cash ﬂow c2,t h eﬁrm
produces the cash ﬂow c2 from an investment I0 that is made at date 0. We assume that τ
C =0 , as in Section 2.2.
In addition, to simplify the notation we assume in this extension that q =0 , that is, if state L is reached the ﬁrm is
in default with probability equal to one.
Investment of I0 units at date 0 p r o d u c e sah i g hc a s hﬂow equal to cHf(I0) in state H,a n dcLf(I0) in state L.
Denote ˆ c = pcH +(1−p)cL,a n ds e tg(I) ≡ ˆ cf(I) for all I, so that average investment opportunities are constant over
time. In addition, and without loss of generality, we normalize ˆ c to 1.
The ﬁrm’s problem at date 0 is now to pick cash reserves (c1) and an amount of debt to issue (whose face value we
denote by d2)t om a x i m i z eﬁrm value, given its current amount of internal funds c0, and its investment opportunities
today and tomorrow.
We make a few additional tractability assumptions. First, we assume that debt capacity is linear in the level of
investments. Thus, the date-1 investments generate debt capacity equal to τIH and τIL, respectively, in states H
and L. Next, We also assume that the debt capacity generated by date-0 investment is correlated with the level of
cash ﬂows. Thus, in state H (L), the ﬁrm can pledge a total of τcHI0 (τcLI0). These assumptions greatly simplify
the calculations below, because they allow us to express the investment levels as explicit linear functions of c1 and
d2. The assumptions can be justiﬁed by a model in which investment cash ﬂows are not pledgeable, but in which
underlying assets can be liquidated by creditors (see also Almeida et al. (2004)).
24
With these assumptions, if we denote the market value of debt as D0,t h e n
D0(d2)=pmin[d2,τc HI0]+( 1− p)min[d2,τc LI0].
The ﬁrm’s optimization problem is thus given by
max
c1,d2
[g(I0) − I0]+pφ[g(IH) − IH]+( 1− p)(1 − φ)[g(IL) − IL] (19)
subject to the ﬁnancing constraints:
I0 + c1 ≤ c0 + D0(d2), (20)
IH ≤ c1 + τIH +[ τcHI0 − d2]
+, and (21)
IL ≤ c1 + τIL +[ τcLI0 − d2]
+. (22)
Notice that the ﬁrm’s cash and debt policies, c1 and d2, respectively, fully determine current and future invest-
ment. As in the basic model, if the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially unconstrained its ﬁnancial policy is irrelevant, so we focus on
constrained ﬁrms.
The constrained ﬁrm’s trade-oﬀ between cash and debt can now be formulated in the following way. Issuing more
debt allows the ﬁrm to invest more at date 0, and/or to hold more cash (see constraint (20) above). However, debt
decreases ﬁnancing capacity in the future, since debtholders will capture the pledgeable cash ﬂows from the date 0
investment, cash ﬂows that can alternatively be used to raise additional ﬁnancing at date 1 (see constraints (21) and
(22) above). As in the basic model, an increase in debt has a particularly large eﬀect on investment in the good state
of the world (IH), since debt repayment will be concentrated in such states. Because higher debt can be compensated
by higher cash balances, a ﬁnancial policy that entails high cash and high debt will transfer resources to state L, while
low cash and low debt transfer resources to state H.




1) depends on the correlation between
cash ﬂows and investment opportunities as follows:
24In other words, the cash ﬂows f(.) and g(.) generate zero pledgeability, but the physical investments I0 and I1 can
be liquidated by creditors. The price of the physical assets (including the non-pledgeable part) in this formulation is
equal to c2 at date 1,a n de q u a lt o1 at date 2.
37• If φ ≤
1




and to choose an interior solution for optimal cash balances, that is:
0 <c
∗
1 <c 0. (23)
• If φ>
1
2, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to issue less debt than the maximum, that is, d
∗
2 <τc Hf. The optimal cash
balances are also as in Eq. (23). In addition, c
∗
1 is decreasing with φ in this range. Assuming that g
00
is equal
to a constant, a suﬃcient condition for d
∗
2 to be decreasing with φ is that the ﬁrm is suﬃciently constrained,
that is, that the pledgeability parameter τ be smaller than a threshold, τ
∗(φ) > 0.





































































where k ≡ 1−(1−p)τcL =1−τ +τpcH. Notice this condition also assumes that τcHI0 −d2 > 0.I fτcHI0 −d2 =0 ,
then we have that IL = IH =
1
1−τ c1,a n dI0 =
c0−c1
1−τ .
These equations can be manipulated to yield the intuitive condition that the ﬁrm should try to equalize the





H − 1) = (1 − φ)(g
0
L − 1) . (26)
The ﬁrm sets its cash and debt policies so that investments can be as close as possible to the levels implied by
condition (26). We characterize the solution for all φ,s t a r t i n gw i t hφ ≤
1
2.
Case with φ ≤
1
2: Notice from Eqs. (21) and (22) that IH ≥ IL for all (c1,d 2),a n dt h u s(g
0
H − 1) < (g
0
L − 1).
Furthermore, for any d2 <τ c HI0,w eh a v eIH >I L.T h u s ,f o ra l lφ ≤
1
2, it is optimal for the ﬁrm not to leave any
spare debt capacity in state H,t h a ti s ,d
∗




L for any c1.
If φ =
1
2,t h i sa l l o w st h eﬁrm to equalize marginal productivities of investment across future states. If φ<
1
2,t h e




L, but this is impossible to achieve using only cash and debt in the way that
we speciﬁed. For example, if φ =0 ,t h eﬁr mw i l le n du ph a v i n gc1 in state H, without any use for it (it will pay a
dividend according to our assumptions).
Summarizing this, we have that d
∗
2 = τcHI0 for all φ ≤
1




L = I1 for all c1.T h eo p t i m a l
amount of cash is then determined acc o r d i n gt ot h ef o l l o w i n gp r o g r a m :
max
c1







This problem is similar to the one solved in Almeida et al. (2004). The solution yields an optimal level of cash
balances c
∗
1, that equalizes the marginal productivities of investment over time. In particular, we must have that
0 <c
∗
1 <c 0.N o t i c et h a ti fc
∗
1 =0 , I1 =0 ,a n di fc
∗
1 = c0, I0 =0 . Given the concavity of the production function g(.),
and given our assumption that ˆ cf0(I)=g(I) for all I, these cannot be optimal solutions.
38Case with φ>
1





L. W ec a nw r i t et h eﬁrst order conditions in (26) as a system of two equations in terms of the endogenous



























































∂φ we need to diﬀerentiate this system of equations with respect to φ




















































The 2×2 matrix that multiplies the vector of derivatives is the matrix of second derivatives (the Hessian) of the
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As u ﬃcient condition for
∂d2












L = constant, this requires that:
φ(k − τcH) − k(1 − φ) > 0
Recall that k ≡ 1 − (1 − p)τcL. Thus, if τ is small enough (and given that φ>
1
2), this condition will hold.
Formally, τ n e e d st ob es m a l l e rt h a nˆ τ(φ) ≡
1
[ φ
(2φ−1)cH+(1−p)cL], which is increasing in φ. In addition, notice that
this expression is more likely to be positive if φ is large, and recall that if φ =
1
2,t h e nd e b ti sa tac o r n e rs o l u t i o ni n
which the ﬁrm issues as much debt as possible. Thus, even if the expression above for
∂d2
∂φ is positive for φ very close
to
1
2,t h eﬁr mw i l ln o tb ea b l et oi s s u em o r ed e b tt h a nτcHI0 and we will obtain
∂d2
∂φ =0as in the φ =
1
2.T h u s ,w e
conclude that
∂d2
∂φ ≤ 0 for all φ>
1
2,i fτ is suﬃciently small.♦
The intuition for this result is similar to that in Proposition 1. If the ﬁrm needs resources mostly in state H (i.e.,
if φ is high), it will prefer to carry less debt and hold less cash. In contrast, if φ is low, the ﬁrm will prefer to carry
more cash and issue less debt at date 0. The additional result in this extension is that the ﬁrm must also balance the
marginal productivity of investment over time. However, because cash savings and debt have opposing eﬀects on date
0 investment, the ﬁrm can generally achieve inter-temporal smoothing under either alternative (high cash/high debt,
or low cash/low debt). The conclusion is that even with date 0 investment, the ﬁnancial policy of the constrained
ﬁrm will depend mostly on the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities (the parameter φ).
Some observations are in order. If φ is large enough, it might happen that the optimal d
∗
2 that equates marginal
productivities falls below τcLf0 (debt becomes riskless). If this is the case, then cash is equal to negative debt in a
“marginal” sense, in the sense that a small increase in c0 could be randomly allocated to either cash or debt without
changing current and future investments. Note however that even in this case cash is not negative debt in a global
sense, since the constrained ﬁrm’s policy of having extremely low debt is an optimal response to the need to save debt
capacity for future good states of the world. Furthermore, if d
∗
2 < 0 (which is possible), then the ﬁrm will not be able
to transfer as many resources as it wants to state H.T h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi nt h i sc a s ei st om a k ed
∗
2 =0 ,a n dc
∗
1 =0 .
Finally, this extension also produces comparative statics that are similar (but not identical) to those characterized
in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2-A Suppose the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained. Then, we obtain the following eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s cash
and debt policies from a variation in the availability of internal funds, c0:
• If the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is low (φ ≤
1
2),t h e na ni n c r e a s ei nc0
increases the ﬁrm’s cash balances (
∂c∗
1




39• If the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities is high (φ =1 )then an increase in c0 has no
eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s cash balances (
∂c∗
1
∂c0 =0 ) , and provided the ﬁrm is suﬃciently constrained, that is, the pledge-
ability parameter τ is smaller than a threshold, τ




Proof: Take ﬁrst the case in which φ ≤
1
2 (high hedging needs). As explained above, we have d
∗










Thus, in this extension the cash ﬂow sensitivity of debt is positive for ﬁr m sw i t hv e r yh i g hh e d g i n gn e e d s .T h e
intuition is that high cash ﬂows allow the ﬁrm to invest more, and because debt capacity is linked to investment
returns, the ﬁrm can also borrow a greater amount at date 0 (a multiplier eﬀect). In addition, as we argued above
the cash policy in this case is determined by program (27). It can be shown that
∂c∗
1
∂c0 > 0 in this case (see Almeida
et al. for a proof). Thus, if hedging needs are high the cash ﬂow sensitivity of cash is positive (as in Proposition 2),
but the cash ﬂow sensitivity of debt is also positive. With date 0 investments, not only it is the case that ﬁrms are
unlikely to use cash ﬂows to reduce outstanding debt, but they might actually display a positive correlation between
cash ﬂows and debt due to the multiplier eﬀect.
Consider now the case in which φ =1 . In this case, the constrained ﬁrm would ideally like to make IH = I0,a n d
IL =0since there is no valuable investment in state L. One way not to have any resources available in state L is to
make c
∗
1 =0 ,a n dd
∗

















(1 − τ − τcH)
(1 − τ)
c0 (29)
T h u s ,w eh a v et h a t
∂c∗
1
∂c0 =0 , and
∂d∗
2





C Other Costs and Beneﬁts of Cash and Debt
We introduce a parameter k to capture in a simpliﬁed way other (net) costs and beneﬁts of cash and debt. We assume
that holding a unit of cash for a period yields a return of (1 − k) next period. For example, given the level of cash
retained in period 0, c1 = c0 − ∆, the cash available for the ﬁrm in period 1 is (1 − k)c1. If, for example, cash has
a low yield as a consequence of its liquidity, the parameter k would be positive. Variables that favor debt issues and
cash retention (possibly related to tax considerations) could be captured by a negative k.
C.1 Solution when k>0
Unconstrained Firms
A cost of holding cash means that unconstrained ﬁr m sw i l ln ol o n g e rb ei n d i ﬀerent between holding cash and repaying
debt. In fact, it becomes optimal for such ﬁrms to carry as little cash as possible, given that cash does not increase
investment for such ﬁrms.
In order to show this, we start by characterizing optimal decisions at date 1,f o rag i v e n∆.F o rag i v e n∆,t h eﬁrm
has an amount of cash equal to (1 − k)(c0 − ∆) available at that date. In the states in which there is no investment
opportunity, the optimal strategy is to pay out this cash so that the ﬁrm does not carry it again into period 2.I n
the states in which there is an investment opportunity, it is optimal for unconstrained ﬁr m st oi s s u ea sl i t t l ed e b t
as possible, so that less cash is carried into period 2. Given that the unconstrained ﬁrm invests I
FB if there is an
investment opportunity, and given the ﬁr m ’ sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ta td a t e1,w eh a v et h a tt h eo p t i m a ld e b ti s s u eB
∗
1 in
states in which there is an investment opportunity satisﬁes
I
FB =( 1− k)(c0 − ∆)+B
∗
1.
If B1 = B
∗
1,t h eﬁrm carries no cash from date 1 to date 2 in states in which an investment opportunity arises.
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40The ﬁr m ’ so bj e c t i v ei st oc h o o s e∆ to maximize this expression, an optimization problem which using the deﬁnition
of B
∗
1 and the relationship between d
N
2 and ∆ can be written as
max
∆
[∆ +( 1− k)(c0 − ∆)].
Clearly, as long as k>0, and conditional on the ﬁrm being unconstrained the ﬁrm beneﬁts from increasing ∆ as
much as possible. Thus, the optimal solution for ∆, ∆
∗,i ss u c ht h a t :
∆


















< ∆max, we cannot guarantee that ∆
∗ = ∆
0
exactly. The problem is that it might be worthwhile for the ﬁrm
to become somewhat constrained in state L given the beneﬁto fr e d u c i n gd e b ta n dc a r r y i n gl e s sc a s h .T h eo p t i m a l
value of ∆ is somewhere between ∆
0
and ∆max.I na n yc a s e ,w eh a v et h er e s u l tt h a tt h ec a s hﬂow sensitivity of debt
should be negative in this case. Both ∆
0
and ∆max are increasing with c0, and thus an increase in c0 reduces the
amount of debt that the ﬁrm carries into the future.
The intuition for the sensitivity result is simple. An increase in cash ﬂow either allows the ﬁrm to repay more
debt directly, or indirectly through a relaxation of the ﬁnancial constraint in state L, in case the constraint becomes
binding. Notice also that even though we have a negative relationship between cash ﬂow and debt for unconstrained
ﬁrms in this case, this relationship should hold irrespective of the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment
opportunities (∆
∗ is independent of φ).
Constrained Firms
The introduction of a cost of holding cash does not change the qualitative nature of the results obtained for the
constrained ﬁrms. First, for constrained ﬁrms that choose to repay debt when k =0 , there is obviously no change in
behavior. Second, because the cost of carrying cash increases, the only change in the result characterized in Propo-
sition 1 is that the threshold φ below which it is optimal for the constrained ﬁrm not to repay any debt should be
lower, and decreasing with k.
C.2 Solution when k<0
Unconstrained Firms
A negative cost of carrying cash translates into a beneﬁto fa l l o w i n gd e b tt ob ea sh i g ha sp o s s i b l e ,w i t ht h ea d d i t i o n a l
proceeds parked in the cash account. A similar reasoning to that described above shows that the unconstrained ﬁrm
beneﬁts from issuing debt at date 0,t h a ti s :
∆
∗ = ∆min.
By deﬁnition, the ﬁrm can only be unconstrained if it is unconstrained in state L when ∆ = ∆min,s on o wt h e r ei sa
uniquely optimal value for ∆.
Since c1 = c0−∆min for such ﬁrms, we get the implication that an increase in cash ﬂow should result in higher cash
savings for unconstrained ﬁrms. Notice that ∆min is independent of cash ﬂow. Again, this implication is independent
of the correlation between cash ﬂows and investment opportunities.
Constrained Firms
As in the analysis of the previous case, there is no qualitative change in the implications for constrained ﬁrms. The
only change is that the threshold above which the ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to repay debt in Proposition 1 will increase.
41Table 1: Constraint Type Cross-Correlations
This table displays constraint type cross-classiﬁcations for the four criteria used to categorize ﬁrm-years as
either ﬁnancially constrained or unconstrained (see text for full details). To ease visualization, we assign
the letter (C) for constrained ﬁrms and (U) for unconstrained ﬁrms in each row/column. All data are from
the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001.
Financial Constraints Criteria Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
(C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms (C) 6,153
Unconstrained Firms (U) 6,231
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms (C) 2,680 1,221 6,060
Unconstrained Firms (U) 1,078 2,645 6,231
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms (C) 2,605 2,190 4,217 922 7,953
Unconstrained Firms (U) 3,548 4,041 1,843 5,309 12,193
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms (C) 4,920 3,229 5,763 1,781 7,689 5,254 12,943
Unconstrained Firms (U) 1,233 3,002 297 4,450 264 6,939 7,203Table 2: Summary Statistics for Financial Constrainsts and Hedging Needs
This table displays summary statistics for beginning-of-period long-term debt (Debt), beginning-of-period
holdings of cash and liquid securities (CashHold), current cash ﬂows (CashFlow), market-to-book asset ratio
(Q), unleveraged Altman’s Z-score, and net debt issuance (∆Debt) across groups of ﬁnancially constrained
and unconstrained ﬁrms and ﬁrms with high versus low hedging needs. Hedging needs are measured based on
the correlation between a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow and various industry-level proxies for investment opportunities (these
alternative measures are used in Panels A through C). All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial
tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001.
Panel A: Hedging needs based on the correlation between firm cash flows and industry R&D
Va ri a b l e
Mean
[Median]
Debt CashHold CashFlow Q Z-Score ∆Debt
Financial Constraints Hedging Needs
Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1968 0.1337 0.0201 1.5284 2.0386 0.0111
(N= 2,537) [0.1791] [0.0830] [0.0329] [1.1906] [2.1758] [—0.0008]
Low Hedging Needs 0.2135 0.1447 0.0320 1.6361 2.0692 0.0096
(N= 1,585) [0.1991] [0.0990] [0.0385] [1.2541] [2.1354] [—0.0019]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1686 0.0845 0.0186 1.3758 2.4610 0.0133
(N= 2,459) [0.1590] [0.0564] [0.0161] [1.1408] [2.4076] [—0.0001]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1703 0.0976 0.0242 1.5985 2.4272 0.0164
(N= 1,467) [0.1672] [0.0601] [0.0228] [1.1802] [2.3867] [0.0000]
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1478 0.1710 0.0315 1.5817 2.6141 0.0095
(N= 2,468) [0.1189] [0.1352] [0.0426] [1.3050] [2.7545] [—0.0023]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1494 0.1787 0.0414 1.6500 2.5550 0.0063
(N= 1,574) [0.1229] [0.1238] [0.0450] [1.2693] [2.6696] [—0.0030]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1771 0.0743 0.0196 1.3420 2.1383 0.0119
(N= 2,427) [0.1671] [0.0525] [0.0202] [1.1307] [2.1401] [0.0006]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1868 0.0938 0.0324 1.6882 2.1742 0.0125
(N= 1,545) [0.1828] [0.0699] [0.0305] [1.2715] [2.2180] [0.0016]
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1492 0.1334 0.0301 1.4189 2.6305 0.0075
(N= 3,351) [0.1334] [0.0940] [0.0342] [1.1470] [2.6839] [—0.0018]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1536 0.1371 0.0367 1.5030 2.5729 0.0080
(N= 2,294) [0.1400] [0.0947] [0.0365] [1.1556] [2.6157] [—0.0019]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1908 0.0861 0.0266 1.4598 2.2460 0.0141
(N= 4,576) [0.1771] [0.0573] [0.0290] [1.2147] [2.2777] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.2032 0.1020 0.0360 1.7106 2.1966 0.0150
(N= 2,754) [0.1894] [0.0694] [0.0370] [1.3326] [2.2066] [0.0000]
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1788 0.1245 0.0255 1.3877 2.4129 0.0110
(N= 5,124) [0.1632] [0.0832] [0.0305] [1.1457] [2.4785] [—0.0015]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1854 0.1296 0.0346 1.5131 2.3557 0.0111
(N= 3,391) [0.1707] [0.0870] [0.0354] [1.1864] [2.4188] [—0.0013]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1654 0.0740 0.0328 1.5428 2.4022 0.0119
(N= 2,803) [0.1553] [0.0528] [0.0322] [1.2656] [2.3766] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1735 0.0952 0.0397 1.8272 2.3947 0.0134
(N= 1,657) [0.1673] [0.0692] [0.0394] [1.4117] [2.3262] [0.0004]Table 2: – Continued
Panel B: Hedging needs based on the correlation between firm cash flows and industry Sales Growth
Va ri a b l e
Mean
[Median]
Debt CashHold CashFlow Q Z-Score ∆Debt
Financial Constraints Hedging Needs
Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2118 0.1338 0.0201 1.5537 2.0189 0.0114
(N= 2,039) [0.1909] [0.0860] [0.0357] [1.2017] [2.1566] [—0.0016]
Low Hedging Needs 0.2137 0.1572 0.0233 1.6970 1.9567 0.0142
(N= 1,622) [0.1886] [0.0979] [0.0326] [1.2807] [2.0396] [—0.0010]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1834 0.0860 0.0202 1.3779 2.3732 0.0140
(N= 2,127) [0.1782] [0.0580] [0.0179] [1.1609] [2.3169] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1685 0.0944 0.0218 1.6206 2.4605 0.0154
(N= 1,510) [0.1596] [0.0619] [0.0221] [1.1922] [2.3971] [0.0000]
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1493 0.1629 0.0343 1.5772 2.5916 0.0080
(N= 2,276) [0.1253] [0.1193] [0.0434] [1.2775] [2.7400] [—0.0032]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1518 0.1879 0.0344 1.7570 2.4955 0.0098
(N= 1,579) [0.1190] [0.1423] [0.0409] [1.3342] [2.6032] [—0.0023]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2106 0.0737 0.0215 1.3881 2.0033 0.0128
(N= 2,107) [0.2059] [0.0506] [0.0231] [1.1572] [2.0264] [0.0013]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1737 0.0879 0.0286 1.6739 2.2410 0.0132
(N= 1,428) [0.1661] [0.0573] [0.0285] [1.2668] [2.2474] [0.0000]
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1486 0.1309 0.0329 1.4314 2.5899 0.0073
(N= 2,980) [0.1364] [0.0971] [0.0359] [1.1559] [2.6736] [—0.0021]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1543 0.1495 0.0324 1.5466 2.5159 0.0087
(N= 2,196) [0.1371] [0.1007] [0.0334] [1.1721] [2.5257] [—0.0016]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2114 0.0883 0.0268 1.4835 2.1873 0.0156
(N= 3,801) [0.2024] [0.0566] [0.0305] [1.2399] [2.1511] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.2047 0.0969 0.0319 1.7057 2.2320 0.0155
(N= 2,836) [0.1857] [0.0620] [0.0356] [1.3328] [2.2763] [0.0000]
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1822 0.1229 0.0278 1.4249 2.3533 .0115
(N= 4,643) [0.1658] [0.0851] [0.0325] [1.1595] [2.4489] [—0.0016]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1916 0.1339 0.0285 1.5156 2.3326 0.0125
(N= 3,392) [0.1733] [0.0853] [0.0314] [1.1828] [2.3779] [—0.0011]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1892 0.0739 0.0332 1.5380 2.3922 0.0129
(N= 2,138) [0.1831] [0.0516] [0.0337] [1.3102] [2.2707] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1674 0.0923 0.0396 1.8858 2.4063 0.0126
(N= 1,640) [0.1535] [0.0618] [0.0407] [1.4789] [2.4018] [0.0000]Table 2: – Continued
Panel C: Hedging needs based on the correlation between firm cash flows and industry Q
Va r i a b l e
Mean
[Median]
Debt CashHold CashFlow Q Z-Score ∆Debt
Financial Constraints Hedging Needs
Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2295 0.1272 0.0191 1.5121 1.9925 0.0105
(N= 1,661) [0.2053] [0.0781] [0.0303] [1.1693] [2.0887] [—0.0018]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1944 0.1657 0.0262 1.7417 1.9896 0.0119
(N= 1,288) [0.1625] [0.1156] [0.0338] [1.2919] [2.0932] [—0.0027]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1865 0.0842 0.0147 1.3053 2.3894 0.0146
(N= 1,661) [0.1821] [0.0547] [0.0139] [1.0686] [2.3538] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1724 0.0934 0.0270 1.5417 2.5325 0.0174
(N= 1,041) [0.1644] [0.0570] [0.0271] [1.2261] [2.5383] [0.0000]
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1637 0.1620 0.0347 1.5684 2.6271 0.0080
(N= 1,631) [0.1414] [0.1160] [0.0414] [1.2532] [2.7018] [—0.0034]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1469 0.1789 0.0414 1.7364 2.5776 0.0073
(N= 1,638) [0.1122] [0.1382] [0.0457] [1.3621] [2.7309] [—0.0027]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2071 0.0702 0.0178 1.2892 2.0687 0.0129
(N= 1,730) [0.2003] [0.0466] [0.0202] [1.0887] [2.0809] [0.0009]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1862 0.0769 0.0300 1.6222 2.0990 0.0178
(N= 808) [0.1707] [0.0493] [0.0328] [1.3651] [2.1578] [0.0017]
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1552 0.1275 0.0320 1.4176 2.6238 0.0097
(N= 2,329) [0.1482] [0.0896] [0.0334] [1.1117] [2.6813] [—0.0016]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1545 0.1402 0.0386 1.5266 2.6382 0.0063
(N= 1,845) [0.1379] [0.0936] [0.0379] [1.1794] [2.6985] [—0.0030]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2214 0.0844 0.0227 1.4035 2.1455 0.0138
(N= 3,048) [0.2043] [0.0520] [0.0265] [1.1677] [2.1976] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1980 0.1118 0.0327 1.7074 2.1965 0.0178
(N= 2,045) [0.1756] [0.0712] [0.0378] [1.3974] [2.2788] [0.0000]
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1940 0.1208 0.0273 1.4093 2.3904 0.0128
(N= 3,757) [0.1779] [0.0786] [0.0306] [1.1229] [2.4754] [—0.0013]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1832 0.1431 0.0335 1.5880 2.4074 0.0114
(N= 2,804) [0.1632] [0.0956] [0.0357] [1.2312] [2.5123] [—0.0020]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1924 0.0646 0.0255 1.4104 2.2710 0.0102
(N= 1,620) [0.1807] [0.0451] [0.0274] [1.1856] [2.2647] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1664 0.0824 0.0405 1.7086 2.4086 0.0148
(N= 1,086) [0.1529] [0.0539] [0.0418] [1.4496] [2.3794] [0.0000]Table 3: The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Debt and Cash Holdings
This table displays 3SLS-FE (ﬁrm and year eﬀects) results of empirical models for debt issuance and cash holdings (see Eqs. (13) and
(14) in the text). Panel A displays the results for long-term debt issuance (net of repurchases), while Panel B displays the results for
changes in the holdings of cash and liquid securities. All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period
is 1971 through 2001. The debt and cash models are jointly estimated (within constraint types) and the empirical error structure allows
for unstructured correlation across models. t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Cash Flow Sensitivity of Debt (Net Debt Issuance)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 N
∆Debti,t CashFlowi,t Qi,t Sizei,t ∆CashHoldi,t Debti,t−1
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.0148 —0.0077** 0.0306** 0.0980 —0.2393** 0.11 3,338
(0.57) (—3.26) (9.40) (1.63) (—16.49)
Unconstrained Firms —0.3531** 0.0004 0.0384** 0.1464** —0.3301** 0.16 3,835
(—21.03) (0.20) (12.32) (2.77) (—21.05)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms —0.0037 —0.0072** 0.0365** —0.0011 —0.2720** 0.11 3,043
(—0.13) (—3.16) (9.40) (—0.02) (—17.11)
Unconstrained Firms —0.2408** —0.0031* 0.0240** 0.2829** —0.2493** 0.10 4,023
(—11.29) (—1.93) (10.41) (3.24) (—19.02)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0642** —0.0114** 0.0330** 0.0060 —0.2629** 0.11 3,844
(2.74) (—6.50) (9.40) (0.14) (—17.70)
Unconstrained Firms —0.2330** —0.0007 0.0240** 0.1214** —0.2708** 0.13 7,836
(—13.50) (—0.49) (10.41) (2.54) (—28.89)
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms —0.0633** —0.0044 0.0344** 0.0359 —0.2636** 0.11 7,039
(—3.43) (—2.78) (15.42) (0.92) (—25.94)
Unconstrained Firms —0.3183** —0.0026 0.0262** 0.2113** —0.2811** 0.14 4,641
(—14.79) (—1.61) (10.93) (2.91) (—22.31)
Notes: *,** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 3: – Continued
Panel B: Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash Holdings
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 N
∆CashHoldi,t CashFlowi,t Qi,t Sizei,t ∆Debti,t CashHoldi,t−1
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.1666** 0.0100** -0.0085** 0.1826** —0.3221** 0.12 3,338
(8.37) (5.09) (—2.82) (3.72) (—20.05)
Unconstrained Firms —0.0088 0.0016 —0.0039 —0.0344 —0.3908** 0.20 3,835
(—0.54) (1.35) (—1.84) (—1.16) (—30.78)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.2201** 0.0064** —0.0154** 0.1593** —0.3323** 0.14 3,043
(9.26) (2.85) (—3.69) (2.84) (—19.89)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0026 0.0033** —0.0042** 0.0326 —0.2385** 0.09 4,023
(0.19) (3.53) (—2.90) (1.05) (—19.52)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.1873** 0.0059** —0.0072* 0.0770 —0.3439** 0.15 3,844
(8.56) (3.20) (—2.09) (1.39) (—23.26)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0369* 0.0049** —0.0084** 0.1002** —0.2951** 0.11 7,836
(2.21) (4.89) (—5.82) (4.34) (—31.12)
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.1422** 0.0073** —0.0091** 0.1422** —0.3290** 0.13 7,039
(4.50) (5.59) (—4.42) (4.50) (—31.27)
Unconstrained Firms —0.0061 0.0032* —0.0069** —0.0061 —0.2702** 0.10 4,641
(—0.22) (3.13) (—4.25) (—0.22) (—22.23)
Notes: *,** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 4: Hedging Needs (Industry-Level R&D Measure) and the Propensity
to Save Cash vs Pay Down Debt
This table reports 3SLS-FE (ﬁrm and year eﬀects) results of empirical models for debt issuance and cash holdings (see Eqs. (13)
and (14) in the text). Each cell displays estimates of the coeﬃcient returned for CashFlow (and the associated test statistics)
separately for sets of ﬁrms with high hedging needs and for sets of ﬁrms with low hedging needs. Panel A displays the results
returned for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, while Panel B displays the results for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms. All data are
from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001. The debt and cash models are
jointly estimated (within constraint types) and the empirical error structure allows for unstructured correlation across models.
t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Constrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.0874* 0.0568 0.1518** 0.0642*
(2.25) (1.40) (3.88) (2.26)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.1071* —0.1365* —0.0812* —0.2788**
(—2.03) (—2.30) (—2.00) (—8.42)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.2011** 0.2571** 0.2532** 0.1852**
(7.44) (8.51) (7.18) (8.70)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.0481 0.0605 0.0987 0.0514
(0.97) (0.92) (1.95) (1.42)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 4: – Continued
Panel B: Unconstrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs —0.4277** —0.1822** —0.1712** —0.4650**
(—9.27) (—3.50) (—5.86) (—10.85)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.5514** —0.1565** —0.3680** —0.2071**
(—12.75) (—2.79) (—9.74) (—3.14)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.05] [0.74] [0.00] [0.00]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.0356 0.0526 0.1087** —0.0157
(1.12) (1.63) (5.75) (—0.47)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.0198 —0.0603 —0.0396 —0.0976*
(0.28) (—1.63) (—1.11) (—2.00)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.84] [0.02] [0.00] [0.17]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 5: Hedging Needs (Industry-Level Sales Growth Measure) and the
Propensity to Save Cash vs Pay Down Debt
This table reports 3SLS-FE (ﬁrm and year eﬀects) results of empirical models for debt issuance and cash holdings (see Eqs. (13)
and (14) in the text). Each cell displays estimates of the coeﬃcient returned for CashFlow (and the associated test statistics)
separately for sets of ﬁrms with high hedging needs and for sets of ﬁrms with low hedging needs. Panel A displays the results
returned for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, while Panel B displays the results for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms. All data are
from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001. The debt and cash models are
jointly estimated (within constraint types) and the empirical error structure allows for unstructured correlation across models.
t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Constrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.1380** 0.1112** 0.1921** 0.1084**
(3.58) (2.61) (5.51) (3.89)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.1888** —0.1768** —0.1125* —0.3041**
(—3.79) (—3.38) (—2.34) (—8.66)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.1997* 0.2662** 0.2180** 0.1924**
(3.99) (4.44) (3.97) (3.96)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.0722 0.0526 0.0185 0.0834
(1.26) (0.73) (0.24) (1.95)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.09] [0.02] [0.03] [0.09]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 5: – Continued
Panel B: Unconstrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs —0.3537** —0.2966** —0.1690** —0.3996**
(—9.93) (—8.87) (—5.96) (—11.11)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.5718** —0.1577* —0.4109** —0.3883**
(—12.85) (—2.12) (—11.76) (—7.23)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.00] [0.10] [0.00] [0.86]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs —0.0586 0.0436 0.0607 0.0171
(—1.29) (1.45) (1.35) (0.44)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.0042 0.0335 0.0604 —0.0875
(0.10) (0.45) (1.34) (—0.90)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.30] [0.90] [1.00] [0.32]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 6: Hedging Needs (Industry-Level Q Measure) and the Propensity to
Save Cash vs Pay Down Debt
This table reports 3SLS-FE (ﬁrm and year eﬀects) results of empirical models for debt issuance and cash holdings (see Eqs. (13)
and (14) in the text). Each cell displays estimates of the coeﬃcient returned for CashFlow (and the associated test statistics)
separately for sets of ﬁrms with high hedging needs and for sets of ﬁrms with low hedging needs. Panel A displays the results
returned for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, while Panel B displays the results for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms. All data are
from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001. The debt and cash models are
jointly estimated (within constraint types) and the empirical error structure allows for unstructured correlation across models.
t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Constrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.1685** 0.1401** 0.3237** 0.0983**
(3.78) (2.74) (7.19) (2.88)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.1206** —0.1051** —0.0549* —0.0348
(—2.63) (—2.67) (—2.03) (—1.71)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.1697** 0.2130** 0.1617** 0.1733**
(5.01) (4.74) (4.05) (6.27)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.1400** 0.0727 0.0273 0.0864*
(2.63) (1.40) (0.57) (2.34)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.64] [0.04] [0.03] [0.06]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 6: – Continued
Panel B: Unconstrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs —0.4342** —0.2890** —0.2889** —0.4642**
(—12.91) (—8.70) (—10.56) (—15.49)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.3406** —0.1612 —0.2122** —0.3952**
(10.47) (—1.16) (—3.57) (—3.26)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.05] [0.37] [0.24] [0.58]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.0097 —0.0174 0.0585* —0.0332
(0.25) (—0.57) (2.19) (—1.03)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.1159* —0.1129* 0.0253 —0.0851
(—2.20) (—2.43) (0.53) (—1.73)
P-Value of Diﬀ. High—Low Hedging [0.05] [0.09] [0.54] [0.38]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.